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I
INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, President Nixon assembled a loose amalgam of
bureaucrats with widely varying institutional backgrounds from several
existing regulatory programs and called it the Environmental Protection
Agency.' Fundamental to the concept of a single integrated agency was the
conviction that an interdisciplinary perspective was essential to rational
environmental policymaking. However, in the rush to assemble an agency to
implement the ambitious regulatory programs that Congress was enacting at
breakneck speed, 2 EPA's early leaders had little time for thinking about how
to structure the decisionmaking process most effectively to harness the
competing perspectives necessary for sound environmental decisions. The
first few important rules (for example, the original National Ambient Air
Quality Standards and the first round of the technology-based standards
under the Clean Water Act) were largely products of single offices within the
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1. See Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two
Agencies 229 (Oxford U Press, 1989). Harris and Milkis conclude too easily that the initial employees
of EPA were environmental zealots. Id at 231. While some of the new hires at EPA joined the
agency out of a strong ideological desire to protect the environment, most of the original employees
that came from existing departments were anything but environmental zealots. See also Alfred A.
Marcus, Promise and Performance: Choosing and Implementing an Environmental Poliy 35-43 (Greenwood
Press, 1980). Landy, Roberts, and Thomas note:
The agency .. .was initially staffed primarily by bureaucrats transferred from other federal
departments. Mostly scientists and engineers, they had long labored in the bowels of large
departments. . . . [Tihey brought with them the concepts, attitudes, and skills that had
served their former agencies. ... By both training and conviction, they were not prepared
to shift from being aid and advice givers to aggressive violation hunters.
Marc K. Landy, MarcJ. Roberts & Stephen R. Thomas, The Environmental Protection Agency: Asking the
JIWrong Questions 34 (Oxford U Press, 1990) ("Asking the Wrong Questions"). Indeed, many managers in
the old line agencies were delighted with the creation of EPA and gladly took advantage of the
personnel transfers to unload some dead wood.
2. The agency currently has important regulatory responsibilities with respect to the following
statutes: National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC §§ 4321 et seq (1990); Clean Air Act,
42 USC §§ 7401 et seq (1991); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 USC §§ 1251 et seq (1982);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 USC §§ 6901 et seq (1982); Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 USC §§ 2601 et seq (1982); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 7
USC §§ 136 et seq (1982); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 USC 99 300F et seq (1982); and
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 USC §§ 9601
et seq (1982).
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growing EPA bureaucracy, and they reflected very little input from
professionals in the other programs. In the beginning, each office was so busy
struggling to stay abreast of its own agenda that few mid-level professionals
kept track of the activities of their counterparts in the other programmatic
offices.
Unlike the older bureaucratic legacies of the Progressive and New Deal
eras, Congress directed the modern health and environmental agencies to be
proactive promulgators and enforcers of rules, rather than neutral
adjudicators. Delegating extraordinary powers to EPA, Congress demanded
that the agency regulate important aspects of industrial life in fundamental
ways. This feat was to be accomplished through informal rulemaking, a
process that merely provided the public with notice of the terms or substance
of the agency's proposal, allowed members of the public an opportunity to
comment on the proposal, and provided the agency's reasons for adopting its
final rule along with its responses to important critical public comments.
The agency's vast discretionary powers did not go unconstrained for very
long. As the federal courts of appeal began to hear challenges to EPA's early
regulations, a body of administrative law began to develop around the
"arbitrary and capricious" test for substantive judicial review, and the "hard
look" doctrine replaced a more deferential view of the role of the reviewing
court. In addition, President Nixon created the "quality of life" review
process for subjecting EPA rules to internal checks within the administration,
and that process gradually evolved into the highly structured (though always
controversial) Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") review process
currently in effect under Executive Order 12291.3 Finally, Congress has
maintained an acute interest in the regulations that EPA writes, and its
oversight of EPA decisionmaking has always been intense and highly
demanding of the political appointees at the top of the agency. Although the
influence of each of these external institutional actors on EPA rulemaking has
varied over time, their combined impact has been enormous. 4
The exigencies of external review and the practical necessities of bringing
multiple perspectives within EPA to bear on the decisionmaking process
determined, to a large degree, the structure of that process. As the agency
evolved, upper-level agency managers made choices about how decisions
would be made within the agency, and those choices greatly affected the
allocation of power within the institution. Most bureaucratic entities pursue
institutional power with the same vigor that they shun accountability. As in all
bureaucratic institutions (in both government and the private sector), great
turf battles have been waged in EPA over institutional power. Much can be
learned about the relative status of agency subunits by observing the structure
3. Executive Order No 12291, 3 CFR 127 (1982).
4. See RichardJ. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law,
54 L & Contemp Probs 311 (Autumn 1991); Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and
the Courts: Twenty )ears of Law and Politics, 54 L & Contemp Probs 249 (Autumn 1991); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and
judicial Deterience of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 Duke L. 300, 326.
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of agency decisionmaking. Who may launch a rulemaking initiative? Who
may participate in drafting the rule and its associated technical support
documents? Who can delay the progress of a rule? Who has the
responsibility for ensuring that the rule is promulgated in a timely fashion?
Who is in a position to veto a rulemaking initiative, and at what cost? All of
these questions critically affect and are affected by the allocation of
institutional power. And the allocation of power within an agency can, in
critical ways, determine its substantive output. 5
This article will examine EPA's evolving internal decisionmaking
structures as they relate to the agency's primary function of promulgating
rules and regulations. Initially, it observes that the New Deal concept of the
"expert agency" breaks down in the modern context of health and
environmental regulation. An agency addressing complex scientific,
economic, and technological issues must draw upon so many different kinds
of expertise that no individual employee can know very much about all of the
issues involved in a typical rulemaking. Drawing on interviews with EPA
employees conducted during the past six years, 6 the article will examine
EPA's unique version of "bureaucratic pluralism" as manifested in the
"team" model that has come to dominate EPA's institutional thought process.
The article will next explore how, under the team model and alternative
5. Landy, Roberts, and Thomas correctly suggest that more than structure is necessary to
integrate perspectives from diverse disciplines:
Integration is partly a matter of structure: the crafting of occasions and relationships so that
relevant specialties come together to raise questions and to respond to each other's
concerns. Structure alone, however, is insufficient. Integration also involves behavior and
hence a concern for recruitment and reward patterns that foster the preferred behavior. An
agency needs to attract people who have the capacity and desire to work with and learn from
those with other points of view. Patterns of promotion must reflect these integrative
commitments.
Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 15 (cited in note 1). Reward structures and
recruitment patterns, however, are beyond the scope of this article.
6. The author has interviewed more than 50 current and former EPA officials over a six-year
period in connection with this and other studies of EPA's rulemaking process. The first set of
interviews was conducted during 1983 and 1984 in connection with a study that the author
undertook for the Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") on regulatory impact
analysis in the federal government. See Agency Procedures for Performing Regulatory Analysis of
Rules, I CFR § 305.85-2 (1991) (Recommendation No 85-2); Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulatory
Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 Tex L Rev 1243, 1246 (1987); Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing
Rationality: Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Government (Cambridge U Press, 1991). A second set of
interviews was conducted in 1986 to update the prior research and to provide background for a study
for ACUS on decisionmaking in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. See Priority
Setting and Management of Rulemaking by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, i
CFR § 305.87-1 (1991) (Recommendation No 87-1). See also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0.
McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 Yale J Reg I (1989).
Finally, a third set of interviews was undertaken in the fall of 1990 to update previous research for
this article. Although many of the earlier interviews were conducted on the record, most of the
recent interviewees declined to speak for attribution. To avoid undue emphasis on earlier interviews,
this article will cite a particular interview only where necessary to provide a source for a direct
quotation. The reader should understand, however, that much of the description of the real-world
decisionmaking process in Part III of this article and many of the insights presented throughout the
article came from the dedicated EPA employees who were kind enough to contribute their time to
conversations with the author and his research assistant.
7. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the JWrong Questions at 12-13 (cited in note 1).
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models, one or another institutional actor gains or loses institutional power
and how the influence of one or another office affects the substantive outcome
of internal agency debates. Finally, the article will describe and analyze four
alternative models for bureaucratic decisionmaking, some of which have been
used at EPA, and it will make some tentative suggestions about how the
agency might choose among the available models in different decisionmaking
contexts.
II
"EXPERTISE" IN THE MODERN REGULATORY ARENA
In the paradigm of the regulatory agencies created during the New Deal,
the regulatory process focused upon a single industry or a discrete group of
related economic problems with the goal of correcting market imperfections.
A regulatory agency could over time acquire sufficient expertise in a particular
subject matter to second-guess private sector decisionmakers on limited
questions, such as the appropriate rates for natural monopolies to charge, the
"correct" supply of an agricultural product, or the amount of information that
should be communicated to consumers of fur coats. While some agencies had
to assemble more than a single type of expertise, the experts were quite
compartmentalized. Rarely did a decision require the application of more
than one or two kinds of expertise, and even more rarely did an issue
precipitate a clash among two or more sources of agency expertise.8
The modern federal agencies that administer "social" regulatory
programs do not comfortably fit within the New Deal paradigm. EPA's
regulations must protect many classes of beneficiaries from a multitude of
harms resulting from an enormous variety of sources ranging from industrial
effluent to household garbage. The extraordinarily ambitious statutes that
Congress has written for EPA require the application of a wide variety of
expertise. For example, to regulate photochemical oxidants under the Clean
Air Act, EPA must draw upon expertise in toxicology, epidemiology, and the
etiology of lung diseases to establish the national primary ambient air quality
standards; expertise in atmospheric chemistry to understand the complex
relationships between precursor pollutants (reactive hydrocarbons and oxides
of nitrogen) and the photochemical oxidants that cause smog; expertise in air
pollution dispersion modeling to understand the extent to which individual
sources contribute to the overall problem; expertise in stationary source
technology to understand what individual sources can do to limit direct and
8. One exception to this generalization might be the earlier manifestations of the Federal
Trade Commission. In its modern day manifestations, the agency economists in the Bureau of
Economics and the agency lawyers in the Bureau of Competition have frequently clashed over the
proper approach to take to a rulemaking proposal. See Robert A. Katzmann, Regulatory Bureaucracy:
The Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust PolicY 180-85 (MIT Press, 1980); James Clifford Miller, The
Economist as Reformer: Revamping the FTC, 1981-1985 (Am Enterprise Inst for Pub Policy Research,
1989). Although the agency did not use rulemaking as a decisionmaking tool before the 1960s, it is
entirely possible that the agency's lawyers and economists disagreed on issues that arose in FTC
adjudications.
[Vol. 54: No. 4
Page 57: Autumn 1991]
fugitive emissions into the atmosphere; expertise in mobile source technology
to understand what manufacturers can do to limit emissions from
automobiles, trucks, trains and airplanes; expertise in transportation and
urban planning to understand how modifying driving patterns and urban
mass transportation can reduce mobile source emissions; expertise in
economics to understand how much all of this will cost and who will pay the
bills; expertise in environmental law to understand the agency's authority to
adopt various options and to predict how the courts will react to the rule and
the relevant support documents; expertise in enforcement to understand the
extent to which compliance with relevant regulations can be induced in the
real world; and expertise in politics to predict how important constituencies
will react and how their reactions will translate into pressure from powerful
external actors in the White House, Congress, and elsewhere.
No individual within EPA has genuine expertise in all of the required
areas. The administrator is typically a generalist with little expertise in any
relevant topic. The agency staff can usually provide high-level political
appointees with a rudimentary understanding of the relevant macro-issues,
but agency decisionmakers must still rely heavily upon the staff's
understanding of subtle nuances. Out of simple necessity, they must trust the
staff to make the "right" calls on the scores of micro-issues that might form
the basis for subsequent judicial challenges.
The expertise upon which the rulemaking edifice rests is thus an
"institutional expertise" that transcends the knowledge and experience of any
individual person or office within the agency. The success of a rulemaking
initiative depends to a substantial degree upon the capacity of the institution
to integrate the contributions of widely varying professional perspectives into
a single coherent product. This is the essence of the "bureaucratic pluralism"
that has necessarily come to dominate the rulemaking process in modern
social regulatory agencies. Yet the matter is not as simple as merely soliciting
the unencumbered scientific input from an assembly line of disinterested
experts.
Each participant brings to the process more than just pure expertise on the
limited issues to which that person's expertise is relevant. Along with the
expertise comes an entire professional weltanschauung that incorporates
attitudes and biases ranging far beyond specialized knowledge of particular
facts. Thus, a decision that draws upon different kinds of expertise will
necessarily reflect a mix of different professional perspectives. In the context
of EPA, the mix of perspectives includes: (1) the scientific perspective (both
pure and applied), (2) the engineering perspective, (3) the management
perspective, (4) the enforcement perspective, (5) the "economic-analytical"
perspective, (6) the legal perspective, and (7) the political perspective.
Health scientists are trained to relate environmental exposures to disease
endpoints in sensitive populations. Materials scientists are interested in how
pollutants interact with metals and other materials to cause damage.
Ecologists are trained to identify complex and subtle changes in interacting
EPA RULEMAKING
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ecological systems that result from externally induced stimuli like pollutants.
The primary professional concern of all three groups is protecting health and
the environment. These groups are less concerned with how exposures can
be reduced (and how much that will cost) than with what will happen if they
are not reduced or if they increase.
Environmental engineers, on the other hand, are trained to design and
implement pollution control technologies. 9 They focus almost exclusively on
how pollutants can be eliminated from waste streams and then managed. For
them a pound of pollutant removed is a benefit, irrespective of the damage
that it would have caused had it remained in the waste stream. Although the
engineers are cost-conscious, they are not especially concerned that the cost
of a pollution reduction technology is exceeded by its monetized benefits.
Instead, they prefer to search for the "knee of the cost curve"-the point at
which the cost per pound of pollutant removed begins to rise at a very rapid
rate-in deciding whether costs are excessive.
Managers are trained to get a particular job done within specific time and
quality constraints. Thejob of EPA's managers is to shepherd the rulemaking
process along in an efficient way to produce rules that will survive judicial and
political review. Managers have expertise in making things happen. They
attempt to foresee and avoid or overcome roadblocks to agency action, which
may be political, practical, or monetary in nature. Managers are pragmatic
people who "know the ropes," and they tend to be a bit cynical about
idealistic notions like preserving the environment and maximizing allocative
efficiency. In sum, they are the agency's experts in "muddling through."
Enforcement professionals are often attorneys, but they can also have
training in scientific and technical areas. They are primarily concerned with
the degree to which those regulated adhere to agency commands. It is,
therefore, important to them that the agency articulate its rules in
unambiguous ways that both fairly apprise regulatees of conduct that is
permissible and impermissible, and minimize the extent to which regulatees
can avoid compliance through interpretational loopholes. Because their
expertise is applied primarily at the interface between the government and the
citizen, the enforcers tend to view the world as a "we-they" system in which
the agency's job is to ensure that regulatees do not avoid the rules. Thus,
while enforcement professionals might balk at alternative inducements such
as effluent charges because they make it difficult to detect cheaters, enforcers
are also opposed to such techniques in a more fundamental sense because
9. See Ted Greenwood, Knowledge and Discretion in Government Regulation ch 3 (1984). Landy,
Roberts, and Thomas observe:
Engineers . .. are trained to solve problems, not resolve them. The formulae and rules
on which they base their calculations are often arbitrary. Nonetheless, they have been
trained to use them to provide numerical solutions. They come to believe that there are
right answers to problems. and that those can be arrived at by manipulating data according
to a unique "best practice."
Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at II (cited in note 1).
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they do not clearly distinguish between socially acceptable and undesirable
conduct.
The agency's economists and policy analysts come to the decisionmaking
process steeped in the "comprehensive analytical rationality" ' 0 paradigm that
dominates American economics departments and business and public policy
schools. Under that model, the analyst must identify the regulatory problem
and break it down into its constituent parts, define and rank the agency's
goals, identify several options for solving the problem, assemble all of the
relevant information, determine (usually by employing ambitious
mathematical models) the extent to which each option advances one or more
of the agency goals, and advocate the option that optimizes the agency's
goals. For economists, all variables are continuous and present the
decisionmaker with an infinite variety of trade-offs.tI The economist/analysts
are typically trained in the concepts and models of neoclassical
microeconomics, and their regulatory philosophies reflect this training.' 2
Although they are prepared to concede that economic efficiency is not the
only goal of the regulatory process, they tend to focus very heavily upon that
goal in their analyses, sometimes to the exclusion of other agency goals.' 3
For them, the acid test for a proposed rule is whether its social benefits exceed
its social CoStS.14
Legal training leads the agency's lawyers to take a highly analytical
approach to solving regulatory problems that differs from the regulatory
analysts' approach primarily in its failure to draw upon the economics
discipline. Attorneys like to explore many options to a given regulatory
result, but they are inclined to truncate the consideration of options that the
agency has no power to implement. The lawyers are primarily concerned with
10. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv L Rev 393, 396
(1981); McGarity, 65 Tex L Rev at 1253 (cited in note 6).
11. Landy, Roberts and Thomas observe:
Unlike either lawyers or engineers, economists are trained to view all variables as
continuous. Regardless of whether price, production, or consumption is at issue, choices
are not "yes" or "no," but matters of amount or degree. Thus, economists instinctively see
all issues as arenas for trade-off and outcomes that produce "a little of this and a little of
that" are often judged desirable.
Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 11 (cited in note 1).
12. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality ch 2 (cited in note 6).
13. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at II (cited in note 1) ("To
[economists] it is obvious that the correct test of a policy is its efficiency and that efficiency is defined
by giving people as much of what they want as possible.").
14. Marcus suggests that the economists in the policy office reflect the "White House" view on
environmental issues, as distinguished from the congressional point of view adopted by the program
offices. Marcus, Promise and Performance pt I (cited in note 1). While it is true that in EPA's early years
certain segments in the White House stressed that the agency should pay greater attention to costs
and certain congressmen and senators urged the agency to forge ahead irrespective of costs, it is far
too simplistic to view the fundamental division between the policy office and the program offices that
has existed at EPA throughout its entire history as merely the struggle in microcosm between the
president and Congress for EPA's soul. The clash of regulatory cultures that has characterized the
relationship between these two offices is more a clash of disciplinary perspective. It has endured
periods (like the Carter Administration) in which the White House was rather sympathetic to
environmental goals and times (like the energy crises of the 1970s) in which Congress has not been
sympathetic toward uncompromising pursuit of environmental ends.
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ensuring that the agency's regulations are within the agency's statutory power
and that the technical and economic bases for its rules pass the minimum
standards for substantive judicial review. Although attorneys tend to urge
caution to private clients when they come near the edge of the law, agency
lawyers typically stress the flexibility that the agency has under its statutes and
urge the agency to probe the limits of its authority. This tendency was
reinforced by the Supreme Court's Chevron holding that the reviewing courts
are to take a very deferential approach toward agency statutory interpretation
when the meaning of the words of the statute is unclear.1 5  Finally, the
training that attorneys receive in law school leads them to emphasize
procedural fairness. In the rulemaking context, this means a concern that all
affected individuals and groups are able to participate fully in the process.1 6
Political expertise is not learned in school, but rather comes with
experience. Nevertheless, it is critical to the success of the rulemaking
enterprise. Agencies rarely staff a designated office with experts in politics,
preferring instead to rely upon the political assessments of the politically
appointed decisionmakers. Still, agencies usually have one or more de facto
political experts, either in the "external affairs" office that deals directly with
the legislature or on the staff of the head of the agency. Like the managers,
the political experts tend to be pragmatists rather than idealists. They
attempt to identify politically powerful constituencies that will be affected
(beneficially and adversely) by a rule and provide advice on the best way to
approach the political review that all important rules must endure.
Since each representative of each professional perspective described above
comes to the decisionmaking process with particular conceptions and
preconceptions about how the world does and should work, bringing together
persons with expertise in all of the relevant disciplines presents a high
potential for a clash.' 7 The clash can be immensely creative or devastatingly
destructive. It must, therefore, be effectively managed if bureaucratic
pluralism is to work. The management at stake here is not of the familiar sort
(ensuring that rules are promulgated in an efficient way according to
schedule); rather, the agency's management must be capable of policy
management-ensuring that lower-level decisionmaking entities adhere to
the policies articulated by upper-level policymakers.' 8 The success of this
15. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837, 844 (1984);
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change and the Rise of the
Administrative Presidency, 73 Cornell L Rev 1101, 1107 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in
the Regulator, State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 444-46 (1989).
16. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 11 (cited in note 1).
17. For a description of some of the early clashes, see Marcus, Promise and Performance at 101-19
(cited in note 1).
18. Landy, Roberts, and Thomas, in their recent study of EPA during the Carter Administration,
suggest that bureaucratic pluralism may not be a desirable approach to regulatory decisionmaking in
EPA, because it hinders the agency in performing a public leadership and educational role. See
Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 12-13 (cited in note 1). They are no doubt
correct in suggesting that structuring the decisionmaking process in a way that effectively delegates
all of the important decisions to the "experts" at lower levels in the agency substantially diminishes
the leadership role that politically appointed upper-level decisionmakers can play. But this ignores
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latter form of management depends heavily upon the structure of the
decisionmaking process.
III
INTRODUCTION TO THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS
An examination of EPA's current decisionmaking processes must begin
with a description of the agency hierarchy and an introduction to the major
institutional players.' 9 The administrator stands at the top of the hierarchy
and is the most important institutional actor. He or she is the final
decisionmaker on agency rules, the ultimate judge in agency adjudications,
and the court of last resort in intra-agency turf battles. With the final say over
the allocation of resources within the agency, the administrator determines
agency priorities and decides which offices play what roles in the
decisionmaking process. Finally, the administrator is the principal
spokesperson for the agency and the primary focal point in interactions
between the agency, the White House, Congress, and the public.
The deputy administrator is the second in command but (like the vice-
president) has only such institutional power as the administrator cares to
delegate. For example, while Deputy Administrator Hernandez was
essentially a nonentity during the Gorsuch Administration, Deputy
Administrator Alm was assigned almost exclusive authority over rulemaking
management during the second Ruckelshaus Administration while
Ruckelshaus attempted to mend fences with Congress and to reassure a
shaken public.
The next level in the formal hierarchy consists of the nine politically
appointed assistant administrators. At this level of the hierarchy, the
historical dual structure of the agency becomes most apparent.20 The agency
is divided into both programmatic and functional areas. Each important
regulatory program within the agency reports to a particular assistant
administrator with programmatic responsibilities, but there are also assistant
administrators for broad functions, such as resource management, research
the unavoidable fact that regulatory agencies have other equally important roles to play. While the
agency has an obligation to educate the general public about what the agency is doing when it
imposes expensive requirements on the regulated industries, alternative decisionmaking models
exist to reduce the risk of poor policy communication. It is probably more important that the
relevant elites in the White House, Congress, and the courts, who have the power to send the agency
back to the drawing board, are convinced that the regulations have a sound technical basis and reflect
the appropriate statutory policies. The authors probably overestimate the extent to which "the man
on the street" cares about the analytical approach,., that the agency takes toward environmental
regulation. EPA has probably fulfilled its public educational responsibilities when it has made the
information upon which it relied available for public inspection and criticism and has satisfied the
news media that it has not been captured by the industry. Indeed, if the agency attempted to assume
a substantially more aggressive educational role than this, it would risk being written off as a
governmental propagandist for a particular point of view.
19. Unless otherwise noted, the following description of EPA's hierarchy is drawn from the
United States Government Manual 1990-91 (Office of the Fed Reg, Spring 1991) and from the
Federal Yellow Book (Spring 1991).
20. See Marcus, Promise and Peformance at 102 (cited in note 1).
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and development, enforcement, and policy management. Originally, there
were five assistant administrators, only two of whom had programmatic
responsibilities, 2' but as the agency's regulatory responsibilities blossomed,
and as the agency became more difficult to manage, new assistant
administratorships were created. 22 The current list of assistant administrators
consists of the assistant administrators with programmatic responsibilities
(the Assistant Administrators for Air and Radiation, for Pesticides and Toxic
Substances, for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and for Water)23 and
those with overall functional responsibilities that cut across programmatic
areas (the Assistant Administrators for Administration and Resource
Management, for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, for International
Activities, for Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, and for Research and
Development) .24
The Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring
has the primary responsibility for enforcing EPA rules. Together with
attorneys from the Justice Department, the lawyers for the Office of
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring investigate potential violations,
prepare enforcement actions, negotiate with polluters, and prosecute civil and
criminal actions in court. The office also has the responsibility for ensuring
that the rules the agency drafts are easily enforced.
Although most of the program offices have economists on staff, the
agency's principal regulatory analysts work in the Office of Policy and
Compliance Monitoring Analysis under the Assistant Administrator for Policy,
Planning, and Evaluation. This central regulatory analysis office, which
functions as a "mini-OMB," has evolved through several agency
reorganizations into a powerful institutional actor. 25 It participates in every
21. The original EPA program offices consisted of the Office of Planning and Management, the
Office of Enforcement and General Counsel, the Office of Media Programs, the Office of Categorical
Programs, and the Office of Research and Monitoring. United States Government Organization
Manual 1971-72, 632 (1972). This structure remained intact only until 1972.
22. At the outset, Douglas Costle, an aide to then-Administrator Ruckelshaus, suggested a plan
whereby the assistant administrators with programmatic responsibilities would gradually be phased
out and their operations lodged under the assistant administrator with functional responsibilities.
This plan was abandoned and never resurfaced. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong
Questions at 35 (cited in note 1); Marcus, Promise and Performance at 103-05 (cited in note 1).
23. Four of the assistant administrators-the Assistant Administrators for Air and Radiation, for
Pesticides and Toxic Substances, for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and for Water-bear
responsibility for implementing the agency's regulatory programs. All of the substantive regulations
that the agency promulgates must have the approval of one of these four assistant administrators,
and all of the regulatory program offices fall under the jurisdiction of one or another of these
assistant administrators.
24. The Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning, and Evaluation is responsible for
centralized regulatory analysis and overall program evaluation. The Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement is responsible for enforcing agency regulations and coordinating enforcement actions
with the states and the Department of Justice. The Assistant Administrator for Research and
Development supervises agency-sponsored research and oversees several agency laboratories. The
Assistant Administrator for Administration and Resource Management is primarily responsible for
budgetary and management functions, and the Assistant Administrator for International Activities
deals with increasingly important transnational issues.
25. The regulatory analysts in the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation began their ascent
during the Carter Administration when Administrator Costle sensed that the mood of the country
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important regulatory decision, often undertakes its own information
gathering activities, relishes its role of institutional gadfly, and is the primary
institutional proponent of market-oriented approaches to regulation.
The general counsel is the agency's chief attorney. The Office of General
Counsel ("OGC") is divided programmatically and functionally, reflecting the
dual organization of the agency. Under the general counsel and two deputy
general counsels, there are seven associate general counsels with their
associated staffs.2 6 0 G C is responsible for legal interpretations underlying
agency rules and for defending those rules in court. Its duty to ensure that
rules survive "arbitrary and capricious" review justifies the office in taking
positions on the substantive merits of proposals and on the technical and
economic validity of the support documents. During the agency's early years,
the OGC attorneys were usually bright young graduates of top law schools
who were committed to social change. 27 As time passed, some of the more
idealistic attorneys departed (especially during the Gorsuch years). The office
now appears less inclined to press hard for stringent environmental
controls .28
The associate administrators are not as easy to place within the
decisionmaking hierarchy. The associate administrator positions were created
during the tenure of Administrator Gorsuch to shift the locus of institutional
power from lower-level career employees to upper-level appointees. 29 The
fact that the new positions did not require presidential appointment or the
advice and consent of the Senate allowed the administrator to staff the
positions with loyal fellow travellers. The original Associate Administrators
for Enforcement and General Counsel and for Policy and Resource
was shifting away from environmental activism and toward a greater regard for the costs of
regulation. According to Harris and Milkis, Costle explained that the agency "wanted to be out in
front in this situation in order to control its own destiny." Harris & Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory
Change at 250 (cited in note i). The analysts continued to thrive during the Gorsuch years. While the
budget for virtually every other office in the agency was cut during the early 1980s, the Office of
Policy, Planning, and Evaluation received an increase in funding. Id at 257. The office, however,
reached its zenith during the second Ruckelshaus administration, when Deputy Administrator Alm
made it very clear to the other institutional actors that the analysts were first among equals.
26. The Associate General Counsel for Air and Radiation; the Associate General Counsel for
Grants, Contracts, and General Law; the Associate General Counsel for the Inspector General; the
Associate General Counsel for the International Division; the Associate General Counsel for
Pesticides and Toxic Substances; the Associate General Counsel for Solid Waste and Emergency
Response; and the Associate General Counsel for Water.
27. Harris and Milkis quote one early EPA official as saying: "Many of the lawyers that came on
board in the early seventies were infused with a certain zeal for the environmental cause." Harris &
Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change at 244 (cited in note 1).
28. For example, in 1985 OGC reversed the Office's long-standing interpretation of the Clean
Air Act to conclude that costs and attainment problems could be considered by the agency in setting
National Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards. Thomas Decides Cost Data Mayl Be Used to Set
Secondary Standards, Official Says, 16 Envir Rep 865 (1985).
29. According to Harris and Milkis, the creation of a separate Associate Administrator for
Enforcement and General Counsel served two functions: "Under the pretext of streamlining the
agency, it gave Burford the opportunity to eliminate some 'unwanted lawyers.' More important
perhaps, it helped to centralize control over enforcement actions, a generic approach of the Reagan
Administration's deregulatory effort." Harris & Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change at 255 (cited in
note 1).
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Management were very powerful institutional entities*30 When Administrator
Ruckelshaus returned to the agency, however, he drastically reduced the
power of the associate administrators. He eliminated the Associate
Administrator for Enforcement and General Counsel and for Policy and
Resource Management and replaced them with Associate Administrators for
Communications and Public Affairs, for Congressional and Legislative Affairs,
and for Regional Operations and State/Local Relations. As their titles imply,
the associate administrators are now concerned primarily with the agency's
interactions with the world beyond Waterside Mall, 3 and in that capacity they
are repositories of political expertise.
The next level in the agency hierarchy (the highest level nonpolitical
appointee) is the office director. Each of the assistant administrators is
responsible for several offices, and each office director is typically responsible
for one important program. The office directors are the actual managers of
agency regulatory programs, and they are the officials primarily responsible
for the substance of agency rules. They are also the officials most easily
accessible to regulatees and important citizen groups. Typically an office
director in one of the program offices assumes responsibility for all of the
agency's substantive rules under a particular statute.32
The offices in turn are subdivided into divisions, each of which has
programmatic or functional responsibilities. For example, the Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards contains the Air Quality Management
Division (responsible for promulgating and overseeing the implementation of
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards), the Emissions Standards
Division (responsible for promulgating new source performance standards
and national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants), the Stationary
Source Compliance Division (responsible for compliance monitoring and
technical support for enforcement), and the Technical Support Division
(responsible for technical support for rulemaking and enforcement activities
and for assembling national databases). Each office director is a senior civil
service employee and is aided by a deputy director of almost equal status.
30. The Associate Administrator for Policy and Resource Management had a virtual veto power
over any regulatory proposals of the assistant administrators. Personal interview with Mr. Joseph
Cannon, Associate Administrator for Policy and Resource Management, Radiation, EPA, May 18,
1984.
31. EPA headquarters are located at the Waterside Mall at 4 10 M Street SW, Washington, D.C.
The edifice, which consists of two twelve-story buildings with an almost connecting three-story mall,
became EPA's home in 1973 when an ambitious urban renewal project undertaken by one of Spiro
Agnew's friends failed and was bailed out by the government. Since the connecting mall has never
been completed, agency employees must still descend into the garage below the east wing of the
building to travel from one wing to the other. The originally promised cafeteria may never be built.
32. Some statutes are broad enough to warrant more than one office. The Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards and the Office of Mobile Sources under the Assistant Administrator for Air
and Radiation both implement programs under the Clean Air Act. The Office of Solid Waste and the
Office of Underground Storage Tanks under the Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response both implement programs under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, 42 USC §§ 6901 et seq (1982).
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The staff sergeants of the agency are the branch chiefs, who are located
just below the office directors in the agency hierarchy. Each branch chief
supervises a staff of agency professionals who do the actual work of writing
and compiling the technical support for agency rules. The branches are
populated by scientists, engineers, and other professionals with training or
experience in environmental management. Though by no means
environmental zealots, the program office professionals tend to be more
concerned about protecting environmental values than about the costs that
are entailed in achieving those goals. 33
Superimposed upon this entire structure are ten regional offices, each of
which has a politically appointed regional administrator and a staff that
reports to the regional administrator but is organized roughly along the lines
of the headquarters staff. The primary functions of the regional offices are to
oversee state and federal permitting processes, approve state implementation
plans and delegations, conduct monitoring and enforcement efforts, and
serve as representatives of the agency to the general citizenry.
The primary collective decisionmaking entity at EPA is the "Steering
Committee," which is a standing group composed of high level
representatives of each assistant administrator and the general counsel. 34
The Steering Committee concept has been in use at the agency since its
inception, and although its importance has waxed and waned through the
years, it has proven remarkably durable. Its purpose is to coordinate and
integrate the agency's regulation development activities. Its operational
functions are to approve "start action requests," to charter and monitor the
progress of staff-level workgroups (with an emphasis on cross-media and
inter-office problems), and to ensure that significant issues that arise during
the internal deliberations are resolved or elevated to upper-level management
for resolution. 35
Any office may submit documents for review or issues for resolution at the
Steering Committee's biweekly (or more often if necessary) meetings. The
Steering Committee is often an intermediate appellate forum for disputes that
could not be resolved in the workgroups. At the end of each Steering
Committee meeting, the chairman writes a "closure memorandum" that
documents outstanding issues, agreements, and actions to be taken in the
future.36 Each Steering Committee member is responsible for directing the
flow of the documents from his or her office through the agency's regulation
management system, for keeping track of relevant deadlines, and for
coordinating his or her office's review of the products of other offices. In
33. Harris & Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change at 244 (cited in note 1).
34. For a discussion of the origin of the Steering Committee, see Marcus, Promise and Performance
at 96-97 (cited in note 1).
35. The Steering Committee, Fact Sheet 1, Regulation Management Series (EPA, May 1990
revision).
36. The Chairman of the Steering Committee is nearly always the Director of the Office of
Regulatory Management and Evaluation in the Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation.
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addition, Steering Committee members are the representatives of their
assistant administrators in the OMB review process.
IV
THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
EPA has one of the most highly developed internal procedures for
generating rules of any agency in the federal government. 37 Since most of
EPA's major rules originate in one of five offices, the following analysis of the
decisionmaking process in EPA will focus primarily upon those offices-the
Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, the Office of Toxic Substances,
the Office of Solid Waste, the Office of Drinking Water, and the Office of
Water Regulations and Standards.
A. The Origin of EPA Rules
Perhaps the most frequent source of EPA rules is a statutory command
that the agency promulgate a particular rule by a specific deadline.38 EPA
rules can also result from internal investigations and from petitions from
environmental groups and industry. Rules originate in "lead offices"
(sometimes referred to in this article as the "program offices") under the four
assistant administrators with rulemaking responsibility. Although it may draw
on other offices to complement its resources, the lead office is the primary
source of technical expertise for the regulatory action. In addition to
technical expertise, nearly all of the lead offices have expertise in economic
analysis. Staff professionals in the lead offices supervise independent
contractors who often do the bulk of the technical and economic data
gathering for the agency rulemaking initiatives. The lead office is also
responsible for organizing and chairing the workgroup for each rulemaking
initiative, setting the schedule for the rulemaking process, and eliciting the
participation of other agency offices and the public. The assistant
administrator in charge of the lead office must designate a project officer to
manage each regulation's development as it moves through the internal
agency procedures.
During its early years, the agency did not have a formal mechanism for
initiating rulemaking efforts. The relevant program office would make a
tentative decision to proceed with a rulemaking initiative and write a
memorandum to the administrator to that effect. This effort often
precipitated a meeting with the administrator or a member of his immediate
staff, and if no objections were raised, the initiative would proceed. As the
agency grew and it became clearer that a rulemaking initiative in one office
37. One high-level staff emloyee at EPA, who had been in six different agencies over a nine-
year period, commented that EPA has the most systematic process for issuing major rules that he had
ever seen. Personal interview with Mr. John M. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy,
Planning, and Evaluation, EPA, June 29, 1984.
38. See, for example, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 USC
§ 6921(b)(3)(C) (1982); Clean Air Act, as amended, 42 USC § 7412(b)(l)(B) (1982).
[Vol. 54: No. 4
Page 57: Autumn 1991]
necessarily required resource reallocations in other offices, this ad hoc
process yielded to a more formalized approval process. The final result was a
computerized "action tracking system" that tracks every important rule in the
agency and measures current progress against predetermined "milestones."-39
The administrator (or any agency employee with a computer, for that matter)
can now ascertain the status of any rulemaking initiative by merely accessing
the action tracking system. The Office of Standards and Regulations under
the Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning, and Evaluation prints out a
biweekly "due or late" list to remind all lead offices when they begin to slip
behind schedule. The system is intended to highlight delays in the
rulemaking process and to attach responsibility for those delays. 40
Under the existing highly formalized internal procedures, the first step in a
rulemaking initiative is the start action request that the lead office submits to
the Steering Committee. 4' The primary purposes of the start action request
are to alert other agency officials to the lead office's intention to develop a
rule and to provide the Steering Committee with an opportunity to discuss
and plan for any inter-office and cross-media aspects of the rule. The request
can also avoid duplication. If one office is aware that another office is working
on a regulatory problem of interest to both offices, they can coordinate their
efforts. Finally, the start action request provides the occasion for specifying
and preparing for subsequent stages of the rulemaking process for the
particular rule.
The start action request is a one-page printed form that is intended to (1)
define the problem clearly, including its health and environmental
significance; (2) indicate the effect of the problem and the intended regulatory
action on other environmental media or programs; (3) identify the EPA
regions and other groups that should be involved; and (4) specify the kind of
expertise and level of participation expected from workgroup members. 42
39. Memorandum on Action Tracking System, from Alvin L. Aim to Addressees 1, Sept 20,
1983 ("AIm Action Tracking Memo").
40. If an office has a good reason for moving a milestone forward in time, it may request the
Office of Standards and Regulations to amend the schedule accordingly. This has the effect of
postponing the time that the next step of the project appears on the due or late list. The requesting
office must, however, explain the requested slippage, and that explanation itself is entered into the
action tracking system. The original schedule and all amended schedules, together with the slippage
explanations, are retained in the system and may be called out of the computer at any time. The
entire history of the project is thus available for inspection.
41. Except where otherwise noted, the following textual description of the internal
decisionmaking process in EPA is drawn from the following sources: Fact Sheets 1-12, Regulation
Management Series (EPA, May 1990 revision); Memorandum on Procedures for Regulation
Development and Review from Alvin L. Aim, Deputy Administrator to Assistant Administrators,
General Counsel, Inspector General, Associate Administrators, Regional Administrators, and Staff
Office Directors, Feb 21, 1984 ("Procedures Memo"); Memorandum on Criteria and Guidelines for
Review of Agency Actions from Alvin L. Alm, Deputy Administrator to Assistant Administrators,
General Counsel, Inspector General, Associate Administrators, Regional Administrators, and Staff
Office Directors, Jan 30, 1984 ("Criteria and Guidelines Memo").
42. Start Action Requests, Fact Sheet 1, Regulation Management Series (EPA, May 1990
revision).
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The start action request also provides the program office's assessment as to
whether the rule will be "major,- 4 3 "significant," 4 4 or "minor. ' 4 5
The Steering Committee representative from the lead office must approve
the start action request and determine whether it warrants discussion at the
next meeting. During the mid-1980s, the Assistant Administrator for Policy,
Planning, and Evaluation had the final authority to approve or disapprove a
start action request,46 but that authority is now apparently lodged in the
Steering Committee. 47 Since the start action request is informational rather
than functional, Steering Committee members rarely object to a program
office initiating the action.
After the Steering Committee approves the start action request, it charters
a workgroup, designates workgroup members from each of the affected
agency offices, and determines what further reviews will be necessary. At this
point, the ball is in the program office's court, and that office proceeds to
work up the technical, economic, and legal support for the rule. By the time a
start action request is approved, the program office has usually devoted some
effort to defining the problem it intends to address and identifying some
possible solutions. The program office's position on the direction the rule
should take is often the product of informal give-and-take among the office's
staff. Since most program offices have their own economists, that perspective
is often represented at these early problem-definition stages. In some offices,
internal teams are assembled to formulate the positions that the program
office will take when it interacts with other offices in the agency and with
upper-level management. These informal intra-office groups can identify
useful options prior to airing a proposal in the workgroup or Steering
Committee. In several offices, representatives from OGC and the Office of
43. "Major" rules are those for which Regulatory Impact Analyses must be prepared under
Executive Order No 12291, 3 CFR § 127 (1982). A "major rule" is any regulation that is likely to
result in:
(1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
(2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State,
or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or
(3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity,
innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-
based enterprises in domestic or expert markets.
Id § l(b).
44. A rule is "significant" if it is not "major" but nonetheless will have important effects on the
environment, public health, or the economy, will present inter-media issues, or will affect the
administration or operation of several EPA offices. Procedures Memo at 2 (cited in note 4 1).
45. "Minor" rules are those that are neither "major" nor "significant." They include the more
specialized and routine rules that affect only one program or sector of the economy, or that simply
implement established agency policy. Id.
46. Criteria and Guidelines Memo (cited in note 41); Telephone interview with Daniel Fiorino,
Acting Director, Regulation and Enforcement Management Division, Office of Standards and
Regulations, Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, EPA, May 23, 1984.
47. Although disapproval of a start action request may have been a realistic possibility at one
time, it so seldom happened that start action requests were routinely ignored by some program
offices and treated on a pro forma basis by many others. In recent years, most offices have prepared
start action requests, but they are all pro forma in the sense that initiatives are never halted at that
early stage.
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Policy, Planning, and Evaluation ("OPPE") are invited to attend the intra-
office meetings, but resource limitations usually prevent the assignment of a
lead analyst or lead attorney to an internal meeting prior to the time that a
workgroup is formed.
B. The Workgroup
1. The Role of the Workgroup. Shortly after the Steering Committee approves
a start action request, the project officer in the lead office must convene a
workgroup. The workgroup is chaired by the project officer from the lead
office, and it contains the lead analyst from the Office of Policy Analysis, a staff
attorney from OGC, and usually staff representatives of the Office of Research
and Development, the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring,
and a regional office. Other offices may send representatives when the
workgroup will be addressing issues that concern them. In practice, the
project officer can attempt to arrange for particular individuals from the other
offices to be assigned to his or her workgroup. EPA's regulation management
training materials somewhat facetiously warn prospective project officers that
finding the best people to become members of the workgroup is not as
important as avoiding the worst staffers; they particularly caution against
placing "rookies ' 4 8 and "bastards" 4 9 on the team.
Attendance at workgroup meetings for unexciting rules can be erratic.
The analysts in the Office of Policy Analysis and the attorneys in OGC are
usually too busy to attend all of the workgroup meetings for rules that they
consider unimportant. The Office of Enforcement is so pressed for time that
the presence of a representative from that office at workgroup meetings is
often the exception rather than the rule. Sporadic workgroup attendance can,
however, lead to friction when nonparticipating offices raise objections or
identify fresh options at the "sign-off' stage very late in the standard
development process. The lead offices justifiably complain that it is unfair for
the other offices to take "late hits" when they could have raised their
objections at the workgroup level.
48. A "rookie" is described as
the poor schmuck who is just in the door and is assigned to the Workgroup because he is
low man. The rookie should be avoided, not because of personal incompetence, but rather
because of lack of institutional experience. You cannot count on them to represent their
office. Usually, they do not have full knowledge of their office's program or concerns. In
addition their access to their management is often limited. That means extra work for the
chairman to identify that office's positions or risk being blindsided later in the process.
William R. Diamond, Practical Aspects of Workgroup Operations, in Regulation Development in
EPA 5 (EPA, 1989) (materials prepared for training new EPA employees).
49. A "bastard" is described as
the person found in many offices who has his own agenda and cannot be controlled by his
office. The problem here is that these loose cannons guarantee delay and disruption. They
exhibit a fanatic unwillingness to compromise and a penchant for loving to hear themselves
talk. Other traits are a lack of a sense of perspective of the relative importance of the issues
and a propensity to beat dead horses. In its most virulent form she will pursue her cause
without concern for ethical considerations. . . . [Y]ou cannot count on these people to
represent their office.
Id at 6.
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As noted above the workgroup is the primary working unit for the
development of regulations in EPA. The goals of the workgroup are to (1)
support the lead office in its design, technical, and analytical work; (2) identify
and assess principal policy issues and options, especially those that are cross-
media; (3) resolve issues or elevate them for upper management's resolution;
and (4) ensure the quality and completeness of regulatory packages. 50
Members of the workgroup do not actually gather data and draft documents,
tasks that are normally the responsibility of the lead office. Instead, they
comment upon and critique documents that others draft.
Workgroup meetings, which occur regularly throughout the life cycle of a
rule, are intended to "provide a forum for sharing expertise" and to help
"resolve conflicts at the start, thus enhancing the quality of Steering
Committee review."-5 1 Another unarticulated, but very real function of the
workgroup is to bring together professionals with different perspectives to
focus their attention on a regulatory problem and debate the appropriate
ways to address that problem. Ideally, the interchange of perspectives helps
achieve a synthesis that goes beyond the outlook or observations of any
individual group member. Obviously, the likelihood that creative synergy will
occur depends upon the level of energy that the workgroup members put into
the effort.
Some workgroups are more active than others. For example, the
workgroups that prepare the decision packages for the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards meet very infrequently. Most of the real drafting and
analytical work is done by informal groups composed of staffers from the
Ambient Standards Branch and personnel from other parts of the agency who
may or may not be members of the workgroup. Several of these informal
groups may be assembled to work on different aspects of a single rule.
Official workgroup meetings are called largely to ratify the work of the
informal groups.
Workgroup meetings for the technology-based Effluent Guidelines and
Limitations that the Office of Water Regulations and Standards promulgates
follow a similar sporadic pattern. The workgroups for these standards are
apparently not a high priority with the Office of Policy Analysis, because that
office rarely sends a participant to the workgroup meetings until after the
program office has nearly completed the drafting and analysis. The same
apparently holds true for the representatives from OGC and the Office of
Enforcement.
For all major and significant regulations, the first task of the workgroup is
to draft a "development plan." The purpose of the development plan is to
explain the need for the action; identify regulatory goals and objectives;
present the major regulatory issues and alternatives; identify any policies,
decision criteria, or other factors that will influence regulatory choices; and
50. The Workgroup, Fact Sheet 3, Regulation Management Series (EPA, May 1990 revision).
51. Procedures Memo at 4 (cited in note 41).
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present the work plan and resource requirements for developing the
regulation. 52 To the extent feasible at this early stage in the rule's evolution,
the development plan is supposed to describe the environmental problem
that the rule is to address, analyze the alternative approaches to solving the
problem, and describe any foreseeable enforcement and implementation
problems. The list of issues identified in the development plan may be
amended as the workgroup progresses.
After the workgroup has completed the development plan, it must submit
it to the Steering Committee for review and approval. Members of the
Steering Committee are then expected to raise cross-media or other issues or
alternatives not identified in the plan; inform the lead office of related
activities underway in the Agency; encourage coordination of Agency
resources, experience, and policies; and review the work plan and schedule to
decide how the various offices will participate and whether they can meet the
time and resource needs of the lead office. 53 Although consensus in the
Steering Committee is not necessary to approve a development plan, it must
be approved by the committee's chairman. In practice, however,
development plans are almost never disapproved. Like the start action
request, the development plan appears to be a procedural device for
informing other program offices and upper-level decisionmakers, rather than
a substantive decisionmaking tool.
Once the development plan is completed, the workgroup's primary tasks
are to make the hundreds of mini-policy decisions that go into the preparation
of proposed and final rules and to oversee the production of the notice of
proposed rulemaking, the regulatory impact analyses, the other technical
support documents, and the "rulemaking package" that accompanies the rule
through upper-level review. The workgroup's progress is documented in
periodic "workgroup reports" to the Steering Committee.54 The reports
describe the issues and options that the workgroup has addressed and
resolved, the status of ongoing work, the likelihood of any delays, and any
issues that the group has been unable to resolve and that must therefore be
52. Development Plans, Fact Sheet 4, Regulation Management Series (EPA, May 1990 revision).
The development plan, drafted during the Reagan Administration, was originally required to discuss
at least the following options: (I) no action; (2) alternatives to federal regulation, including market,
judicial, or state or local regulatory mechanisms; and (3) alternatives within the scope of the action's
legislative provision, including degree of control, effective compliance dates, and methods of
ensuring compliance. Criteria and Guidelines Memo at 4 (cited in note 41). It is not clear that
discussion of the first two options is mandatory under the current administration.
53. Development Plans, Fact Sheet 4 (cited in note 52).
54. During the mid-1980s, the workgroup was required to prepare a formal "Options
Memorandum" for Steering Committee review (and for use in the now-defunct options
selection/rejection process). That document was supposed to list the options, summarize the
arguments for and against each option, and state the position of each office on each option.
Telephone interview with Mr. Stuart Sessions, Acting Director, Regulatory Policy Division, Office of
Policy Analysis, OPPE, EPA, May 29, 1984. This requirement theoretically provided an opportunity
for upper-level decisionmakers on the Steering Committee or at higher levels to choose among the
options at an early stage in the rule development process, rather than forcing them to concur or
dissent in the option agreed upon by the workgroup. This process was abandoned at the end of the
Reagan Administration.
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elevated to the Steering Committee. The project officer from the lead office
submits the report to the office's Steering Committee representative for
review; the other group members are supposed to brief their respective
representatives on the issues that may arise at the Steering Committee
meeting in which the report is discussed. The workgroup chairman typically
attends the meeting to facilitate any discussion. The Steering Committee is
supposed to focus on cross-media or other issues and alternatives not being
considered by the workgroup and on resolving issues on which the workgroup
could not reach consensus. Steering Committee concurrence in the report,
which is documented in a closure memorandum, should ensure that issues
resolved are not raised again later in the process.
The workgroup's final product is a rulemaking package that is composed
of the workgroup's suggested draft of the proposed rule, the draft preliminary
regulatory impact analysis, other required documents, and a decision
memorandum outlining the options, detailing the pros and cons of each
option, and explaining why and when each was rejected. The package must
also estimate the resources required for implementing the rule, including
enforcement plans and anticipated regional resource requirements.
2. The Interaction of Professional Perspectives in the Workgroup. It is at the
workgroup level that the multiple rulemaking perspectives are corralled and
brought to bear on scores of issues that must be resolved before a proposed
or final rule may be presented to the administrator for approval. Each
member of the group is aware of the fact that the other members bring to the
workgroup meetings their own professional perspectives and the policy
preferences of their institutional homes. Sometimes this baggage leads to
creative compromises; sometimes it produces debilitating acrimony. Yet,
since each member of the group knows that he or she will have to live with the
others throughout the potentially protracted rulemaking process (and
probably through similar rulemakings in the future), there is virtue in civility,
and compromise is usually the order of the day. Few workgroup members
relish the prospect of being shunned as a "bastard."-55
In EPA's early years, it was fairly easy to predict how the representative
from a particular office would approach a particular issue. For example, the
lead analyst from the Office of Policy Analysis was dependably wedded to the
synoptic paradigm and predictably provided the brakes when the group
appeared to be leaning toward options at the expensive end of the
spectrum. 56 The attorney from OGC was usually a bright and gung ho
"Nader's Raiders-type" who pressed interventionist solutions to regulatory
problems to a degree far beyond that mandated by a conservative reading of
the statute.57 The lead office scientists and engineers were often similarly
oriented toward command-and-control solutions to regulatory problems with
55. For the given definition of "bastard," see note 49.
56. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 256-61 (cited in note 6).
57. See Harris & Milkis, The Politics of Regulatot, Change at 244 (cited in note 1).
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little regard for costs. 58 The professionals from the enforcement office were
interested in strict enforceability and were very skeptical of innovative
approaches that would give regulatees greater flexibility to reach equivalent
environmental protection at less cost.
The offices are not, however, as homogeneous as they once were.
Workgroup representatives do not as often hew to the party line; indeed, it is
not as clear that there is a party line to follow in some offices. Individual
talents and personal philosophies can be more important than institutional
loyalties. Nevertheless, while generalizations are less warranted today, each
office pursues some of the broad goals of the regulation production process
with more vigor than others, and different offices rank the agency's goals
differently. Some determinants of agency policy seem relatively timeless and
survive the arrivals and departures of individual agency officials.
To test this hypothesis, the author conducted a survey of twenty-six agency
employees with extensive experience in the EPA rulemaking process. The
survey listed ten agency goals and asked the respondents to rank on a scale
from one-to-ten the vigor with which each office represented on the
workgroup pursued each of the goals. The ten goals were
(1) Timeliness-producing rules in a timely fashion;
(2) Administrative Efficiency-writing rules in an efficient way that
conserves agency resources;
(3) Scientific and Technical Credibility-producing rules with a sound
scientific and technical basis;
(4) Allocative Efficiency-writing rules that are efficient from an
overall societal perspective;
(5) Fidelity to Statute-implementing policies that are consistent with
the agency's statutes;
(6) Judicial Review-producing rules capable of surviving judicial
review;
(7) Political Review-producing rules that are capable of surviving
political review;
(8) Enforceability-producing rules that can be implemented and
enforced;
(9) Fairness-producing rules in a manner that fairly considers the
views of all affected constituencies; and
(1 0) Multimedia Considerations-producing rules that reflect important
multimedia considerations.
The offices the respondents were asked to rank included
(1) the relevant program office;
(2) the science advisory apparatus; 59
(3) the policy office (OPPE);
(4) the Office of General Counsel;
58. Id.
59. Although all respondents were asked about the scientific advisory apparatus, no
representatives of the apparatus were surveyed.
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(5) the enforcement office; and
(6) the regional offices.
The respondents were promised anonymity and were encouraged to elaborate
on their answers. The results for individual offices are reproduced in Table 1.
TABLE 1
TOTALS FOR ALL PROGRAMS*
Agency
Goals
Timeliness
Administrative
Efficiency
Scientific and
Technical
Credibility
Allocative
Efficiency
Fidelity to
Statute
Judicial
Review
Political
Review
Enforceability
Fairness
Multimedia
Program
Office
7.3
2-10
26
7.2
2-10
26
7.9
3-10
25
6.1
3-10
26
7.8
3-10
25
7.6
2-10
24
7.1
4-10
26
7.1
4-10
26
7.5
0-10
26
5.9
0-10
24
Science
Advisory
Apparatus
4.3
2-9
20
4.3
0-9
19
9.1
7-10
21
4.9
2-9
19
6.3
3-9
17
5.6
2-9
18
4.4
1-8
18
4.8
2-8
17
5.6
0-10
18
7.5
2-10
15
Office of
P, P & E
5.4
3-9
26
5.4
1-10
26
6.8
2-10
25
8.2
5-10
25
6.1
0-10
25
5.7
2-8
25
7.4
4-10
25
5.5
0-10
26
6.9
2-10
25
8.3
6-10
24
Office of
General
Counsel
5.3
1-9
26
5.0
1-9
25
6.9
1-9
25
5.3
1-9
26
9.1
5-10
25
9.5
6-10
24
6.8
2-10
25
7.2
4-10
26
6.9
2-9
26
6.0
0-10
24
Office of
Enforcement
5.6
3-9
22
5.0
1-8
20
6.3
2-8
22
4.6
1-9
22
8.2
5-10
21
8.0
5-10
20
6.0
2-10
20
9.0
6-10
22
6.2
2-9
21
5.8
0-10
21
Regional
Offices
6.7
2-9
20
5.7
1-9
20
6.8
3-9
18
6.1
1-9
20
6.8
4-10
19
5.9
0-8
18
5.9
2-10
19
8.5
6-10
20
7.2
4-10
19
7.0
3-10
18
* Numbers in each box represent the average of all responses; the range of responses; and the total
number of responses,
a. Timeliness. One important goal for all regulatory organizations is to
produce regulations in a timely fashion. External reviewing institutions, like
Congress and the courts, judge an agency by its ability to do what Congress
tells it to do within a reasonable time, if not necessarily within the extremely
ambitious deadlines to which Congress occasionally subjects EPA. Yet
timeliness is not necessarily at the top of the agenda of every office within the
agency. 6°) For example, the scientists in the Office of Research and
Development and in the various scientific advisory committees are more
committed to deliberation and less attuned to the program office's desire to
60. The first row of Table I suggests that timeliness is a much higher priority for the program
office than for any other office.
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produce regulations by particular deadlines. 61 Similarly, timeliness is not
always at the top of OGC's agenda.62 Even assuming that every institutional
actor strongly desires to promulgate agency rules in accordance with statutory
or administratively established deadlines, the greater the number of
institutional players, the greater the potential for delay.
The ever-present desirability of further research and monitoring can be
used by the workgroup as a conflict-avoidance device when members fail to
achieve compromise or when the workgroup seeks to avoid conflict with
external groups. Conversely, delay can also be used for strategic purposes
within the internal decisionmaking process to extract substantive concessions
from offices that must account for delays. Because the program office is
usually directly accountable for producing rules in a timely fashion, other
offices, like OGC and OPPE, which are not as directly affected by delays, can
threaten to devote more intensive review to aspects of a proposal to which
they object as a lever to persuade the program office to delete or modify those
aspects.
b. Administrative Efficiency. All of the offices within the agency have a
putative interest in conserving the agency's scarce resources, but balkanized
bureaucracies do not always behave in efficient ways. Each office's
determination to preserve its own scarce rulemaking resources provides every
incentive to shift burdensome aspects of individual rulemaking efforts to the
other participating offices. It is easy enough, for example, for the regulatory
analyst from OPPE to demand still another study of the effects of a regulation
on a particular segment of the regulated industry if the expense of that study
comes out of the program office's budget. Similarly, one office's priorities
(shaped by its own concerns for administrative efficiency) may cause
inefficiencies in other offices. For example, if putting a rule to one side until a
more experienced attorney can review it is more efficient from OGC's
standpoint, it may do so without regard to the possibility that the resulting
delay thereby idles five staffers in the program office. Finally, not every office
has the same regard for administrative efficiency as the program office whose
resources are primarily at stake during the rulemaking process. 63
61. It is apparent from Table I that the frequent participants in the rulemaking process surveyed
believe that timeliness is a fairly high priority to the program office but not very important to the
science advisory apparatus. See also Marcus, Promise and Performance at I l1 (cited in note 1).
62. For example, OGC spent six years internally debating whether proposed rules for asbestos
release from demolition activities would comport with the amendments to the Clean Air Act that
followed the Supreme Court's holding in Adams Wrecking Co. v United States, 434 US 275 (1978).
Although significant asbestos exposure was occurring at demolition sites, an EPA attorney
acknowledged that "[tihe legal people spent a lot of time arguing about how to respond to the court
case." Envir Rep Curr Dev (BNA) 2251 (April 20, 1984).
63. Table I suggests that the participants in the rulemaking process believe that administrative
efficiency counts much more in the program office than in the other offices. This suggestion may be
undermined somewhat, however, by the fact that far more of the respondents came from the
program offices. It may well be that the participants felt obliged to rank administrative efficiency
higher for purposes of the questionnaire than they do in real life decisionmaking. After all, no
bureaucrat is likely to go on record as being in favor of administrative inefficieno,.
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c. Scientific and Technical Credibility. One of the most devoutly aspired-to
goals at EPA is scientific and technical credibility. According to the
"transmission belt" theory of delegated regulation, the agency is supposed to
be a reservoir of scientific and technical expertise. 64 The legitimacy of the
original delegation of decisionmaking power to regulatory agencies depends
(in the minds of many observers) upon the agency's ability to produce rules
with sound scientific and technical underpinnings. 65 Yet when we pierce the
agency's external veil, we quickly discover that few of the really important
issues that it addresses in complex rulemakings are reducible to scientific facts
and engineering judgments. It becomes readily apparent that scientific and
technical credibility is not an all-encompassing goal for all offices that
participate in the decisionmaking process. 66
Scientific and technical credibility is less important than enforceability for
the agency's enforcers. The agency's economists are seldom reluctant to
challenge the program offices' models and interpretations, 67 but their reason
for doing so is usually a desire to produce less costly regulations, rather than
to enhance the technical support for the program office's positions. Although
scientific and technical credibility is important to the lawyers in OGC, arriving
at the "truth" in an absolute sense is not nearly so critical for them as
conveying the perception that the agency has conscientiously considered all of
the credible points of view. The reviewing courts do not demand scientific
accuracy where uncertainties preclude firm conclusions, 68 but they do require
the agency to consider the relevant information and explain why it accepted
some studies and rejected others.69 The attorneys sometimes resist candor,
especially when it might undercut the technical basis for the option that the
agency adopted.70
d. Allocative Efficiency. Regulatory agencies have long been accused of
placing overall societal efficiency on a lower plane than other programmatic
goals. Economists in academia and government believe that allocative
efficiency is best achieved when the benefits of a regulation outweigh the costs
64. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1669,
1684 (1975).
65. See, for example, Joseph D. Rosen, Much Ado About Alar, 7 Issues Sci & Tech 85 (Fall 1990).
66. Table 1 indicates that while scientific and technical credibility is high on everyone's list, it is
a much higher priority for the program office and the scientific advisory apparatus (the most
vigorously pursued goal by both offices) than the other offices that participate in the process.
67. See EPA Deputy on Verge of Crucial Policy Decision, Clearing Major RCRA Rule, II Inside EPA 12
(Jan 12, 1990) (detailing a disagreement between EPA's Office of Solid Waste and OPPE over the
appropriate assumptions underlying a proposed model for predicting how much a waste dissipates as
it travels through groundwater).
68. Ethyl Corp. v EPA, 541 F2d I, 28 (DC Cir 1976) ("Where a statute is precautionary in nature,
the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge[J,] we will not demand rigorous proof of cause and effect.") (court upholds lead
phasedown regulations); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v Hodgson, 499 F2d 467, 477 (DC Cir 1974)
(court upholds Occupational Safety and Health Administration's standard for asbestos).
69. Portland Cement Co. v Ruckelshaus, 486 F2d 375, 398 (DC Cir 1973).
70. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 79 (cited in note 1).
[Vol. 54: No. 4
Page 57: Autumn 1991]
of compliance. 7' Yet many offices in EPA undeniably fail to assign allocative
efficiency a high priority for a variety of reasons. The scientific advisory
apparatus does not pay particularly close attention to the costs of regulations,
although cost considerations occasionally shade the scientists' views of the
merits of regulatory proposals. 72 Similarly, the enforcement office's attention
to the cost of regulations focuses mainly upon the incentives that expensive
rules provide for regulatees to avoid complying with them. Although EPA
attorneys are not always strong proponents of allocative efficiency, their
desire to see the agency's regulations survive judicial review sometimes causes
them to advocate cost-effective solutions to regulatory problems. 73
The economists in OPPE are the agency's strongest advocates for
efficiency.74 They are constantly urging workgroup members to count the
costs of the regulatory options. 75 Although the analysts have occasionally
pressed for more stringent regulatory options, 76 much of the time the
economists' concern for allocative efficiency translates rather easily into an
uninhibited demand for less stringent regulations. 7 7 This tendency leads
other participants in the decisionmaking process to question whether
allocative efficiency is a goal worth vigorously pursuing.
e. Fidelity to Statute. Since every regulatory agency must point to a
statute for its authority to regulate private conduct, implementing policies
that are consistent with its statutes ihould rank high among EPA's goals. Yet,
even this unobjectionable goal is pursued more vigorously by some offices
than others. The matter is complicated somewhat by the fact that Congress
71. See Allen V. Kneese & Charles L. Schultze, Pollution Prices and Public Policy: A Study Sponsored
Jointly by Resources for the Future, Inc. and the Brookings Institution (Brookings Inst, 1975); Lester B. Lave,
The Strategy of Social Regulation: Decision Frameworks for Policy 3-4 (Brookings Inst, 1981).
72. See text at note 58.
73. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 11 (cited in note 1).
74. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 258-59 (cited in note 6); Landy, Roberts & Thomas,
Asking the Wrong Questions at 11 (cited in note 1). EPA has prepared formal Regulatory Impact
Analysis Guidelines for the program offices and their consultants. Guidelines for Performing
Regulatory Impact Analysis (EPA, 1983). These guidelines reveal a lot about the OPPE's viewpoint.
The guidelines adopt a strong quantitative approach to assessing the costs and benefits of EPA
regulations. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 17.1-74 (cited in note 6).
75. Table 1 indicates both that allocative efficiency is by far one of the highest goals of OPPE in
the minds of frequent participants in the internal rulemaking process, and that allocative efficiency
matters much more to that office than to the other offices.
76. For example, an analyst from OPPE provided much of the information that EPA used to
justify its strinigent lead phasedown regulation. The agency also relied on studies undertaken by that
office to justify not relaxing the ambient air quality standard for particulate matter. McGarity,
Reinventing Rationality at chs 3-4 (cited in note 6).
77. For example, when EPA was deciding whether to amend the national ambient air quality
standard for photochemical oxidants, the economists in OPPE pressed so hard for a reduced
standard that they helped the White House Regulatory Analysis Review Group prepare its assault on
the program office's proposed regulation. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 71-
72 (cited in note 1).
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often uses such vague language in its statutes that it is difficult to determine
whether one or another regulatory option will advance the goal of fidelity. 78
OGC plays a dominant role in ensuring that the agency writes rules that
are consistent with the agency's statutes. 79 Even when, as is often the case,
the agency's statute gives it some leeway to choose among several regulatory
options, the general counsel's role is to tell the program officer which of the
options are clearly within the realm of the agency's authority and which are
close calls. The representatives from other offices in the workgroup may
ignore OGC's pronouncements only at a fairly high risk of having the entire
matter remanded by upper-level policymakers during Red Border Review (see
below), where the general counsel's interpretation of the statute is rarely
questioned.
In addition to its role as statutory interpreter, OGC plays a quality control
role. To ensure that rules survive substantive judicial review, the agency's
attorneys often delve into the technical, economic, and legal underpinnings of
the rules, and the attorneys seldom feel confined to pristine questions of
statutory interpretation. Since many of the important and controversial
science and policy disputes that arise in EPA rulemaking are ultimately
resolvable only by reference to policies that originate in the agency's statutes,
the attorney's role may range broadly into areas that other members consider
to be within their own professional bailiwicks. This bifurcated role for OGC
can thus lead to friction with the other offices and to the aggrandizement of
institutional power of lawyers with their own ideas about appropriate
regulatory policy.
OPPE rarely allows deference to OGC's interpretation of congressional
policy directives to stand in the way of its pursuit of economically efficient
standards. For example, even though the courts have held that the Clean Air
Act forbids cost considerations in promulgating national ambient air quality
standards, ° the policy office constantly raises cost considerations in
workgroup and in other high-level, intra-agency forums. Indeed one highly
placed official in that office during the second Ruckelshaus administration said
that it was important to document the costs of achieving the national ambient
air quality standards to "rub everyone's nose in the senselessness of the
statute." 8'
78. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U Pa L Rev 549, 555-
59 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
Stan L Rev 321, 335 (1990).
79. Table I indicates that the participants in the rulemaking process regard fidelity of the statute
as the second most intensely pursued goal in OGC. The table also shows that the program offices
and the Office of Enforcement regard statute fidelity highly as well.
80. American Petroleum Institute v Costle, 665 F2d 1176, 1185 (DC Cir 1981) (court upholds EPA's
revised national ambient air quality standards for photochemical oxidants); Lead Industries Ass'n v
EPA, 647 F2d 1130 (DC Cir) (court upholds EPA's national ambient air quality standards for lead).
81. See also Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 106 (cited in note 1)
(detailing the dispute between the policy office and the program office over the costs of regulations
for the disposal of hazardous wastes).
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The science advisory apparatus, while providing supposedly scientific
advice, can also show contempt for statutory policy prescriptions. For
example, when EPA was revising the national ambient air quality standards
for photochemical oxidants, James Whittenberger, a professor of physiology
at the Harvard School of Public Health and chairman of a Science Advisory
Board subcommittee, argued strongly that the scientists should offer their
advice on what was an acceptable risk and what was an adequate margin of
safety. Even though specifically instructed that economic considerations were
not supposed to play a role in the decisionmaking process, Whittenberger
remarked: "In spite of what the legal requirements are, it seems to me that
eventually we are going to have to take economics much more into
consideration."-82 Thus, even scientists can place their views of appropriate
regulatory policy ahead of the policies articulated by Congress.
f. Judicial Review. Since the courts have the power to set aside agency
rules that are not in accordance with agency statutes, or that are otherwise
arbitrary and capricious, all institutional subunits have an interest in
producing rules that are capable of surviving judicial review. Although, as
previously discussed, OGC is primarily responsible for ensuring that the
agency is interpreting its statutes correctly, all of the offices are responsible
for ensuring that the agency's regulations survive arbitrary and capricious
review. A remand means more work and wasted time. Still, some offices view
this goal more seriously than others.
Obviously, OGC regards surviving judicial review as a primary goal. When
the agency suffers a judicial remand, OGC is often blamed. The program
offices and the Office of Enforcement also assign a high priority to successful
judicial review. 83 The science advisory apparatus, by contrast, cares more
about scientific correctness than about whether three judges think that the
agency has reached a good result. OPPE is similarly much less concerned
about pleasing the judges than about writing rules that provide the greatest
benefits to society at the least cost.
g. Political Review. A rule that is capable of surviving judicial scrutiny
may not survive political review in institutions (primarily OMB and Congress)
that have the power to impede the rulemaking process. Again, the fact that all
of the offices have a stake in the successful survival of a regulation does not
mean that they all pursue this goal with equal vigor. The program offices
must be highly interested in the views of influential members of Congress and
White House officials. The views of congressional staffers and of the
82. Id at 53. The Secretary to the Science Advisory Board also became involved in the debate
between the program office and the policy office over the proper level of the national ambient air
quality standard for photochemical oxidants. Cost considerations persuaded him that the agency
should not take a conservative approach to setting the standard. Id at 70. He took this position
despite the fact that the statute bars cost considerations.
83. Table I reveals that successful judicial review is a high priority in the program office, OGC,
and the Office of Enforcement, but is much less important in the science advisory apparatus, OPPE,
and the regional offices.
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economists and analysts in OMB do not matter very much to the science
advisory apparatus. The analysts in OPPE have little regard for the interest
group-oriented political concerns of congressional staffers. They are much
more attentive to the cost-sensitive concerns of OMB, but often regard OMB
input (which they believe is more often interest group-oriented than
analytical) cautiously. Finally, the regional offices are very concerned about
how EPA programs are perceived at the local political level. Systematic
political missteps on the local level can quickly translate into serious political
problems at the national level. In addition, if the regions send inconsistent
signals to regulatees and the public, EPA as a whole may suffer politically. 84
h. Enforceability. Producing rules that are easily implemented and
enforced is ultimately the responsibility of program offices, but the entity with
the greatest concern for enforceability is, of course, the Office of
Enforcement. The professionals in that office are proud of their familiarity
with the "real world beyond the Beltway" where some of the best laid plans of
the agency's scientists, engineers, economists, and attorneys go badly awry.
Perhaps because attorneys usually see implementation as a matter of writing
and enforcing rules, enforceability is also a high priority for OGC.8 5
Although the Office of Enforcement does not always send representatives to
workgroup meetings, when they do attend, they come armed with a healthy
skepticism about innovative new approaches that are supposed to save overall
costs by increasing the flexibility of regulatees. For example, when many
other offices in the agency became enthusiastic about the "bubble" policy in
the late 1970s, the Office of Enforcement was justifiably worried that
companies would trade enforceable emissions (for example, monitorable
emissions through a stack) for unenforceable emissions (for example,
promises to wet down streets and coal piles on a weekly basis).8 6 In
retrospect, the Enforcement Office's skepticism was warranted; many of the
early bubbles were of this unattractive variety. Sometimes the Enforcement
Office representatives argue for stringent regulations simply to allow the
agency to negotiate from a position of strength in subsequent enforcement
actions where the real limitations on the conduct of regulatees are
established.87
i. Fairness. Like other regulatory agencies in a society of limited
government, EPA must concern itself with the extent to which the public
84. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 240 (cited in note 1) (recounting
a dispute between headquarters staff and regional offices about the definition of "reasonably
available control technology" under part D of the Clean Air Act).
85. See id at 123 (relating OGC's opposition to the use of "best engineering judgment" as the
test for permitting hazardous waste disposal facilities on the ground that it was too vague to be
implemented consistently).
86. See id at 216-18. Interestingly, for reasons that are not very clear, OGC supported the
policy office in this debate. Id.
87. See Brian J. Cook, Bureaucratic Politics and Regulatory Reform: The EPA and Emissions Trading
(Greenwood Press, 1988).
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perceives its decisionmaking procedures as fair. Yet fairness is not an
especially significant goal of any of the headquarters' offices. The attorneys in
OGC have received training in principles of due process that capture fairness
in a formal sense, and that office insists that the agency adhere strictly to the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 88 But it does not often
insist that the agency go beyond the minimum criteria of that statute unless
required by another statute. However, because the regional offices have
direct hands-on experience with companies and people who are affected by
EPA regulations, they are inclined to be very concerned about public
perceptions of fairness. 89 The regional office staffs are more inclined than
headquarters' personnel to meet informally with affected regulatees and
beneficiary groups to discuss particular criticisms of EPA proposals.
j. Multimedia Considerations. Although EPA has retained its
programmatic divisions, the agency has become increasingly convinced that
the focus of most rulemaking initiatives on controlling pollution in only a
single medium has not sufficiently taken into account cross-media aspects of
pollution and pollution control technologies. If a regulation promulgated
under the Clean Air Act accomplishes no more than transferring residuals
from the air to the water or soil, it is not at all clear that the environment has
benefitted. Similarly, it is unsettling to learn that publicly owned sewage
treatment works are large contributors to toxic air pollution. 90 The agency's
leadership has often worried that decisions made by one program with respect
to a specific chemical substance could narrow the range of options available to
other programs to deal with the same chemical. In 1987 the agency launched
a "toxics integration project" to explore a cross-media approach to chemical
regulation,9 1 and in 1988 it created a separate Office of Pollution Prevention
with a cross-media focus. 9 2
Because the agency's leadership has recently sent a strong message to
lower-level officials that multimedia considerations are important, they are
putatively high on the agendas of all of the offices in the agency.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that single-medium program offices do not spend
much time thinking about the effects of their regulations on media that are
88. On Table I, fairness ranks fourth on the list of goals for OGC.
89. See Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the Wrong Questions at 211 (cited in note 1).
90. Raymond C. Loehr & Calvin H. Ward, Waste Treatment Practices and Cross-Media Transfer of
Pollutants, in Cross-Aledia Approaches to Pollution Control (Natl Acad Sci/Natl Res Council, 1987); PPE
Eyes In-Plant Steam Stripping to Cut Voc Air Emissions from POT11's, 7 Inside EPA I (May 2, 1986)
(alluding to doubts about EPA's authority under the Clean Water Act to regulate air emissions from
publicly owned sewage treatment plants); Small Business Standards Disputed in Rulemaking for Chemical
Plants, 17 Envir Rptr (BNA) 36 (May 9, 1986) (same).
91. See Aim Chooses Butadiene and Cadmium for Trial Toxics Integration Project, 4 Inside EPA II (Dec
23, 1983) (reporting Deputy Administrator Alm's decision to apply an integrated cross-media
approach to two chemicals as models for the toxics integration project).
92. See Envir Rptr (BNA) 384 (July 22, 1988). Since most of the respondents were from the
program offices, this evaluation is especially significant.
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regulated by other offices,9 3 except in relatively rare cases in which one office
recognizes in advance that a proposal from another office may force the first
office to regulate more or less stringently. 94 OPPE is currently the agency's
principal exponent of multimedia approaches to regulatory decisionmaking. 95
OGC also has an important role to play in implementing multimedia
approaches, because it is the ultimate interpreter of the agency's statutes,
including the gap-filling Toxic Substances Control Act. 96
3. Workgroup Deliberations. One desideratum of the workgroup approach is
to inspire creative collective thinking about innovative regulatory alternatives.
The lead office has the first opportunity to identify options, based upon the
judgment and prior experience of its staff scientists and engineers. Innovative
options often arise out of interchanges between the technical lead office staff
and the regulatory analysts in the lead office. In the Office of Solid Waste, for
example, the regulatory analysts have pressed the technical staff to make more
explicit the use of risk-assessment techniques and benefits analysis, and to
allow for greater discretion at the permit stage to ensure that hazardous waste
disposal standards afford maximum flexibility for considerations of location,
nature of waste, and other site-specific concerns.97 The other offices
represented on the workgroup occasionally suggest additional options, but in
most cases the lead office's technical judgment and experience appear to
dominate the options-identification effort. In practice, the workgroup
members are more useful in reviewing the options that have already been
identified than in identifying fresh options.
Two leading goals of the workgroup are to arrive at a consensus on the
analysis of various options and, if possible, to agree upon a single option to
recommend to upper-level decisionmakers. The members of the workgroup
feel some pressure from their superiors to reach consensus. Busy
decisionmakers usually want to know why the workgroup members were
unable to work things out on their own.
The workgroup process offers innumerable opportunities for members to
apply their expertise to regulatory problems and to use the tools that are
available to them to steer the group toward each member's preferred
alternatives. If one representative on the workgroup can legitimately claim
greater expertise or experience in an area addressed by the rule, other
members are likely to defer to that member. Nevertheless, the cardinal rule of
93. Table 1 indicates that the interviewers believed that OPPE pursued multimedia
considerations more vigorously than any of the other nine goals, though only slightly more
vigorously than allocative efficiency.
94. See Air, Drinking Water Offices Clash over Regulation of Organic Chemicals, 5 Inside EPA I (March
16, 1984).
95. Table I indicates that multimedia considerations is the second most vigorously pursued of
the ten identified goals.
96. 15 USC §§ 2601-2671 (1982).
97. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 254-55 (cited in note 6).
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the seasoned workgroup participant is, "trust, but verify."98 Even the group's
expert is expected to provide data and analysis to support his or her position.
Since resources are always in short supply, an office that can contribute
resources to the process can thereby increase its influence. For example,
although the program office staff ordinarily drafts the important rulemaking
documents, any member of the workgroup can volunteer to draft portions of a
document, and such overtures are rarely refused. While all of the other
members will have ample opportunity to comment upon and suggest changes
to the drafted language, the volunteer has an opportunity to shape the
document in subtle ways that can heavily influence the direction that the
rulemaking initiative takes. Similarly, a member who volunteers to collect and
analyze information on a particular issue has a significant opportunity through
subtle interpretations, assumptions, and information display techniques to
shape how the rest of the members perceive that data.
Precedent and the search for consistency can also shape the workgroup's
output. If one member can document a prior occasion in which the agency
resolved an issue in a particular way, the group is likely to adhere to the
precedent. Thus, participants with significant experience in the agency can be
very influential on some workgroups.
Although the representative from each office comes to the meetings with
strong preconceptions and professional biases as well as institutional
positions to defend, a good deal of "horse trading" usually takes place during
workgroup meetings. For example, the representative from the policy office
may be willing to retreat from his or her cost concerns if the representatives
from the program and enforcement offices are willing to accept a greater
degree of flexibility in crafting the regulatory requirements. These none-too-
subtle tradeoffs are essential if the group is to reach the much desired
consensus at the end of its deliberations.
Workgroups also provide many opportunities for strategic alliances among
representatives who share the same approach toward resolving important
issues. Although consensus is the goal, there is strength in numbers, and a
large enough faction can bring around the rest of the members. Strategic
game playing is limited, however, by the knowledge that the holders of
minority positions can always elevate the dispute to the Steering Committee
level and beyond.
Perhaps the most powerful tool available to a workgroup member is the
threat of delay. The project officer from the lead office (who is also the
chairman of the workgroup) is responsible for bringing the initiative to
fruition in accordance with a prearranged time schedule that is documented
by the milestones in the action tracking system. It is very difficult for the
project officer to decline legitimate requests for more information or for time
to study complicated data and analyses more thoroughly. Yet it is equally
difficult to know whether the workgroup member requesting additional time
98. Diamond, Practical Aspects of Workgroup Operations at 9 (cited in note 48).
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is doing so out of genuine concern for the integrity of the decision or out of a
desire subtly to extract concessions out of the lead office. Since OGC and
OPPE do not feel especially bound by program office calendars, they most
frequently employ this tactic.
A determined project officer can attempt to steamroller a regulation
through the process by setting unrealistic deadlines for comments from the
other offices, by meeting at inconvenient times, and by ignoring the input of
other offices. But this tactic may backfire at the Steering Committee stage
when the representative of one of the other offices (often at the request of that
office's representative on the workgroup) objects to the workgroup's
proposal. As with the workgroup, the goal of the Steering Committee is to
reach consensus, and decision packages can be remanded to workgroups to
meet the concerns of the objecting Steering Committee members.
In assembling the technical support for an important rule, program offices
frequently identify those controversial scientific issues the proper resolution
of which is critical to the substantive outcome of the rulemaking. When the
workgroup agrees that the issue is scientific in nature and is likely to be both
controversial and outcome-determinative, it may refer the matter to the
Science Advisory Board for advice. Staffed by the Office of Research and
Development, the Science Advisory Board is composed entirely of prestigious
academic, industry, and environmental group scientists who have agreed to
offer scientific input on critical scientific issues that the agency faces. Some
programs have their own outside scientific advisory groups established by
statute. For example, the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee reviews
the technical support documents for all of the national ambient air quality
standards, and the Scientific Advisory Panel in the Office of Pesticides
Programs reviews all pesticides rules and potential pesticide cancellation
actions. Obviously, some care must be taken in drafting the questions for
these committees to avoid receiving policy prescriptions, rather than scientific
advice. In practice, it is very difficult to confine the committees to "pure"
scientific issues, especially in those committees that are chartered to review
the scientific aspects of all of a program's regulations. The advisory
committees usually prepare detailed written reports that are incorporated into
the decision packages and the rulemaking records. Although the committees'
pronouncements on scientific questions are not binding on the agency, the
workgroup must be prepared to explain any significant disagreements that it
has with its scientific advisors.
C. Steering Committee Review
The rulemaking packages for major and significant rules are sent to the
Steering Committee for final review. The Steering Committee reviews all
major rules and many significant rules at a regular meeting. 99 Members of the
99. Some significant rules may be disposed of through the "consent calendar." Procedures
Memo at 8 (cited in note 41).
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Steering Committee rarely suggest options that have not already been
identified at the workgroup level. The Steering Committee is more a
reviewing body than an institution for developing innovative solutions to
regulatory problems. The Steering Committee meeting on a rulemaking
package can be a forum for debating issues that have not been resolved in the
workgroup. In addition, one of the committee's responsibilities is to identify
significant issues for upper-level management, whether or not the workgroup
has reached consensus on those issues. The closure memorandum drafted by
the Steering Committee chairman documents the committee's resolution of
outstanding issues. '0 0
A recently adopted alternative to Steering Committee review for finished
workgroup products is the Workgroup Closure Meeting. This meeting
provides a forum for confirming that the workgroup has resolved as many
outstanding issues as possible and has clearly defined the remaining issues.
The Workgroup Closure Meeting is attended by the regular workgroup
participants, but is chaired by the chairman of the Steering Committee. Each
participant is supposed to come to the meeting prepared to state the position
of his or her assistant administrator. A closure memorandum is prepared to
document the positions of the respective offices. The assistant administrators
are theoretically bound to the documented positions taken by their
representatives in the meeting.
D. Red Border Review
After the Steering Committee has concluded its deliberations, the package
is cleared for "Red Border Review." This process is the formal review
procedure whereby senior management (usually assistant and regional
administrators and the general counsel) reviews and approves regulatory
packages for all rules (including minor rules) before they are presented to the
administrator. The review always includes the general counsel and the
Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning and Evaluation, and other
assistant administrators for offices that were represented on the workgroup.
Usually at this point the parties to any remaining disputes attempt to resolve
as many open questions as possible in informal meetings, often at the
assistant administrator level. Reviewing offices may make written comments
and transmit them to the lead office. After responding to relevant comments,
the lead office prepares the package for transmittal to the administrator and
OMB.
E. Final Rules
The agency procedures for responding to public comments on a proposed
rule and for preparing the final rule and its accompanying regulatory package
100. EPA has experienced a few problems with differing interpretations of closure memoranda.
On some occasions, each side to a debate has read the closure memorandum to seal a victory for its
point of view. On other occasions, one office has disagreed with the closure memorandum's
interpretation of the outcome of the meeting.
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are virtually identical to the procedures governing the preparation of the
initial rulemaking and regulatory analysis documents. The project officer in
the lead office is responsible for assembling the public comments and
breaking them down by issue as far as possible. The agency sometimes hires
contractors to read and separate the comments. The comments are then
distributed to the personnel who drafted the portions of the documents that
the comments addressed. After the various offices have had a sufficient
opportunity to respond individually, the project officer calls a workgroup
meeting to discuss how the agency as a whole should respond to the
comments. The workgroup again attempts to reach consensus on the changes
that should be made in light of the public comments. The workgroup's
recommendations and dissenting opinions are then forwarded to the Steering
Committee and from there sent to Red Border Review.
V
STRUCTURAL MODELS FOR THE INTERNAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
On paper, EPA has currently adopted a relatively pristine version of the
team model for most of its rulemaking initiatives. The workgroup is the
functional staff-level team, and the Steering Committee is the high-level
management team. Although the team model is the most familiar
decisionmaking model in the federal government, it is by no means the only
one available. Other models offer some advantages over the team model, but
they have disadvantages as well. Many agencies and departments have
adopted different models in different decisionmaking contexts, and EPA itself
has informally resorted to alternative models when conditions dictated. The
remainder of this paper will identify and analyze some of the competing
models available to EPA and offer some observations about when one model
might be superior to the others.
A. The Team Model
The basic decisionmaking unit under the team approach is the team
composed of representatives from all of the institutional subunits within the
agency that have an interest in the outcome of the rulemaking process. The
team meets periodically to discuss regulatory options, to examine problem
areas, to respond to requests of upper-level decisionmakers, and to resolve
disputes among team members. Although a single office usually has overall
responsibility for the rulemaking effort, the group can delegate tasks to
individual members or small subcommittees. All team members receive
copies of pertinent decisionmaking documents for review and comment. All
are supposed to be co-equal partners in pursuit of the common goal of
promulgating a rule that will survive internal and external review. Team
members usually feel pressure from other participants and from their own
superiors to reach consensus on important issues.
As we have seen, the team approach has several advantages over other
models, the most significant of which is its capacity to bring multiple
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professional perspectives to bear on issues that arise in complex rulemakings.
The team model allows the agency to base its decision on a wide range of
information and analysis from multiple sources. It may also facilitate
innovative, cross-disciplinary thinking about novel options for solving
regulatory problems. The very concept of a team connotes harmony and the
pursuit of common goals that may take the adversarial edge off of interactions
among persons with divergent professional perspectives and policy
preferences.
Because it incorporates all of the relevant institutional actors into a single
decisionmaking entity, the team model has the potential to avoid time-
consuming delays when the final staff product is reviewed by upper-level
decisionmakers. Because the assistant administrators are represented on the
team, they are expected to raise their concerns at the team level and not at
higher levels where the only option is to go back to the drawing board. At the
same time, the pressure for consensus in the team meetings relieves upper-
level decisionmakers of the necessity of attending lengthy meetings in which
minor issues are debated exhaustively. The team model thus allows busy
decisionmakers to delegate a good deal of the decisionmaking authority to
agency staff, secure in the knowledge that most important issues will either be
resolved by the team in an acceptable manner or elevated to the top levels of
the hierarchy.
Finally, the team model has the capacity to provide the integration of
programs that a multimedia approach to pollution control demands. If the
agency insists that each of the program offices assign a person the
responsibility of keeping track of how the team's regulatory options affect the
environmental medium overseen by that office, the agency is more likely to
adopt an option that has the most beneficial overall impact on the
environment.
The team model also has disadvantages. The foregoing description of the
team model at EPA suggests that it can be very resource intensive and time
consuming. The agency must maintain a staff of experts from a variety of
disciplines and allow them sufficient time to interact on teams. Every member
of the team must be educated on the essential issues and encouraged to make
his or her contribution. The greater the number of institutional actors that
must be consulted, persuaded, and cajoled, the longer it takes to get a plan
approved. This is especially true if the team model operates sequentially
without periodic meetings to encourage communication and put everyone's
position on record. If every office must see the input of every other office
before it is willing to sign off on a plan, the process can degenerate into a
never-ending loop. In addition, as we have seen, when delay can be used for
strategic purposes, more delays are likely.i ° 1
The multiplicity of experts from different offices also presents problems of
accountability. In the agency's hierarchy, the members of the team do not
101. See Marcus, Promise and Performance at 25 (cited in note 1); discussion at part IVB2a.
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report to the team chairman. In the real bureaucratic world, where rewards
are bestowed and punishments meted out, the team representative is
accountable only to his or her own boss. If a team member fails to honor a
commitment within the agreed-upon time frame, the workgroup chairman
may complain to the member's boss, but the most realistic alternative is to
proceed ahead without the foot-dragger's input. Within EPA this latter
option may result in delays later in the process when upper-level officials from
the sluggard's office raise objections that the team member should have raised
during the initial review process.
The pressure toward consensus that is one of the advantages of the team
approach may also be a disadvantage, because it has the potential to steer the
group away from the best solutions. Since few employees desire to be placed
in the "bastard" category, they may compromise too readily on important
points, thereby depriving upper-level decisionmakers of the opportunity to
determine which resolution is best.
Worse, team members are susceptible to a mind-numbing malady that
Professor Janis calls "groupthink." According to Janis, "members of any
small cohesive group tend to maintain esprit de corps by unconsciously
developing a number of shared illusions and related norms that interfere with
critical thinking and reality testing."' 10 2 The team model can effectively line
up all of the relevant institutional actors behind a single recommendation to
the decisionmaker, leaving the decisionmaker with only two realistic options-
to accept the staff recommendation or to remand the matter to the staff. The
net result may be that "[w]hen compromise positions reach a high-level
executive in a form that suggests a unified, consensual judgment, they can
give the ultimate decisionmaker a false sense of security; the policymaker
receiving the watered-down proposals may lack an awareness of the potential
problems buried within the recommendations."'10 3
Perhaps the most significant disadvantage of the team model is its
potential to shift the locus of policymaking from upper-level political
appointees to career staff. This shift can happen in several ways. First, a
critical aspect of bureaucratic decisionmaking is the function of initially
identifying the universe of possible options to solve the problem and the
continuing process of narrowing those options to the one that the agency
ultimately selects. The team model, especially as practiced at EPA, has a
strong tendency to lodge this crucial aspect of rulemaking discretion at lower
levels in the agency hierarchy. For example, one of the articulated goals of
the EPA workgroup is to reach consensus on the proposed and final rules.
Yet if the workgroup reaches consensus and that consensus is maintained (as
is usually the case for important issues) throughout Steering Committee and
Red Border Review, there is very little for the ultimate decisionmaker (the
102. Irving Lester Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and
Fiascoes 35-36 (Houghton, Mifflin, 1972).
103. George C. Edwards, III & Ira Sharkansky, The Policy Predicament: Making and Implementing
Public Policy 128 (Witt Freeman, 1978).
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administrator) to decide. If he or she asks for an options memorandum at this
late stage in the rulemaking process, the result is likely to be a perfunctory
effort in which the staffs preferred option is sandwiched between two
impractical red herrings. The only real option for the decisionmaker is to
remand the entire matter to the staff with orders to start over. And even that
is not a realistic option for rules that must be written by statutory or court-
imposed deadlines. In reality, the important decisions (including significant
policy determinations) are often made by the staff.
A second way in which the team model shifts decisionmaking discretion
from high levels to low levels stems from the policy-dominated character of
much scientific decisionmaking in modern regulatory agencies like EPA.
While the concept of an expert agency demands that the staff be given a wide
degree of discretion to resolve scientific and technical questions, most of the
controversial issues that arise in environmental rulemaking are mixed
questions of science and policy that are typically stated in scientific terms, but
are resolvable only as policy questions. 10 4 If the staff professionals are
allowed to resolve these science/policy issues, they may apply different
policies than those preferred by upper-level decisionmakers. The team model
allows lower-level staff to disguise policymaking behind the veneer of
professional consensus.
A third way in which the team model can shift the locus of power lies in
that which might be termed "policy inertia." To the extent that teams possess
the subtle policymaking discretion described, they will tend to pursue the
same policies that they have always followed. We have seen that one of the
strongest arguments in workgroup meetings for pursuing a particular option
or adopting a particular policy is that the agency has done it that way in the
past. This inertial force resists rapid shifts in agency policy. Even if one or
more of the team members detect a change in policy at upper levels in the
agency, the pressure for reaching a consensus dampens their enthusiasm and
reduces the extent to which the policy change can be implemented through
the workgroup vehicle. In the absence of direct appeals to upper-level
decisionmakers, where the new policy can be made more explicit, the team is
likely to pursue old policies.
At the extreme, the team approach can produce such a strong consensus
among lower-level team members that it becomes a "renegade team" that
attempts to impose its views of correct policy upon politically accountable
upper-level decisionmakers through leaks to the press and other techniques of
sabotage. During the Reagan years, OSHA teams frequently wrote policy-
oriented memoranda to upper-level decisionmaking entities and
simultaneously leaked them to the press. Convinced that their advice would
never be heeded by anti-interventionist, upper-level decisionmakers, the
teams made their case to other policymakers. Thus, critics on Capitol Hill
were armed for their attacks on the agency by the very teams to which the
104. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of
Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 Georgetown L J 729 (1979).
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agency had entrusted the preparation of the agency's support documents.' 0 5
The phenomenon so irritated the assistant secretary for OSHA that he
abolished a rather intricate team system that he had only recently (and with
much fanfare) established, and replaced it with a more hierarchical approach
that lodged most decisionmaking authority in faithful middle-level
appointees. 0 6 The power of career bureaucrats to co-opt political appointees
bent on re-orienting bureaucratic norms is well known, but the "renegade
team" that literally battles the politically appointed leadership on its own
political turf is much rarer. Whether the OSHA experience may be translated
to EPA is an open question, but it is a possibility that should not be ignored.
These disadvantages of the team model from the policy management
perspective may be viewed as advantages from the broader perspective of
Congress and the public. The concept of the bureaucracy as an inertial force
is certainly not new, and it may contribute to the overall stability of a
regulatory program. Few regulatees and beneficiaries of regulation are well-
served by a bureaucracy that swings wildly between policy extremes as
administrations change or as new disaster stories reach the media.
Nevertheless, a strong team model tends to distance regulatory policymaking
from the electorate and to expand the discretion of unelected experts.
B. The Hierarchical Model
Under the hierarchical model, a single office is responsible for all aspects
of a rulemaking initiative except for the final determination of whether the
rule is consistent with the particular statute involved. The program office
initiates the rulemaking effort; it gathers data and information; it identifies the
relevant options and narrows them; it prepares the relevant support
documents and economic analyses; and it bears responsibility for the
completed package as it moves up the agency hierarchy. The program office
rarely calls upon outside scientific or technical expertise, nor does it abide
skeptical regulatory analysts and their constant worries about the costs of
agency proposals. Enforcement concerns are met insofar as the program
office is aware of and decides to deal with them. Although the agency lawyers
can veto an initiative at late stages of the rulemaking process on the ground
that it exceeds the scope of the statute, any input they might have on the
adequacy of the technical basis for the rules may freely be ignored. 0 7
105. In defense of some of the "renegade teams" at OSHA, the upper-level management during
those years did at times insist that the teams adhere to extra-statutory policies that ran diametrically
counter to prior agency goals. While some of the external criticism that the agency received was well
deserved, the point here is that the team model produced a surprisingly independent roadblock to
the new administration's policy initiatives.
106. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Report from the Office of the Chairman
Administrative Conference of the United States to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety
and Health, OSHA, on OSHA Rulemaking Procedures (Feb 19, 1987). See also McGarity,
Reinventing Rationality at 218-19 (cited in note 6).
107. Landy, Roberts, and Thomas appear to advocate a version of the hierarchical model for all
EPA decisionmaking. They recommend that the agency be restructured into a "divisional" form of
organization under which each assistant administrator would be responsible for all aspects of rules in
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The hierarchical model is followed in most regulatory programs in the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. For example, in the Agricultural
Stabilization and Conservation Service, a commodity specialist in the program
office drafts the "work plan" for a rule; prepares all of the support documents
and an options memorandum for the "policy guidance session" (mid-level
review meetings closely resembling Steering Committee review in EPA);
prepares a closure memorandum for the policy guidance session; drafts the
proposed rule, preamble, supporting documents, and the regulatory impact
analysis; prepares a summary of outside comments after the notice and
comment period for a subsequent policy guidance session; and drafts the final
rule and supporting documentation and analyses.' 08
EPA probably adhered to an impure version of the hierarchical model in
its early years, and it still resorts to that model on occasion. For example, in
the early 1970s, the Office of Pesticide Programs was very insular, even
though it was increasingly apparent that pesticides had very important cross-
media impacts. Regulations and pesticide cancellation actions made their way
up the hierarchy within the Office of Pesticide Programs with little input from
other offices until reaching Red Border Review. 10 9 After several successful
judicial actions by environmental groups forced EPA to initiate cancellation
hearings for a group of important pesticides, the locus of decisionmaking
power for these actions shifted for a brief time to OGC, which likewise
adhered to the hierarchical model. OGC secured funds to hire outside
experts to testify in pesticide cancellation actions and otherwise to advise the
office of which additional regulatory actions should be undertaken. The
program office learned of major actions (such as the suspension of
heptachlor/chlordane) in the newspaper.110
EPA tends to resort to the hierarchical model when the agency is under
great pressure from outside sources to accomplish something in a hurry. A
good example is the agency's resort to the hierarchical model in 1979-80
a given "line of business." "Such units would include all the types of expert needed to develop and
manage a complete program, incorporating them into an organizational context which forces them
to confront a broader definition of their responsibilities." Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the
Wrong Questions at 298-99 (cited in note 1). While this kind of reorganization would have several
advantages, it would also have many of the serious disadvantages of the hierarchical model discussed
above. One of the primary disadvantages would be the inevitable decline in the influence of the
agency's regulatory analysts, who would apparently be relegated to the already existing subunits
within each of the program offices. It is unclear whether the authors would split OGC up and send
the lawyers to the relevant program offices. If so, the agency could lose a great deal in consistency of
legal approach to similar legal problems. In both instances, the agency would no doubt lose much in
the way of independence of analysis.
108. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 194-97 (cited in note 6).
109. See ChristopherJ. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics 183-84 (U Pittsburgh Press, 1987). Perhaps
because they are so numerous, pesticide tolerance actions still receive very little input from the other
offices. Although the team model is putatively in effect, for all but the most controversial policy calls
(for example, whether the agency will use a de minimis approach toward implementing the Delaney
Clause), the hierarchical model dominates.
110. This arrangement came to an abrupt end after powerful congresspersons from agricultural
states almost succeeded in returning jurisdiction over pesticide cancellation actions to the
Department of Agriculture.
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when the courts and Congress pressed the agency to promulgate regulations
for hazardous waste generation and disposal. Ultimately, the Assistant
Administrator for Solid Waste seized control of this initiative to the exclusion
of the other offices. During this period of intense activity,
[t]he agency's internal procedures proved inadequate to the task of creating such a
complex program. [Assistant Administrator] Jorling, and his successor, Beck, reduced
the "red border review" process and the attendant working groups and steering
committees to a hollow ritual. If the Office of Solid Waste did not know enough to
think clearly about its own problems, the Office of Policy and Management [now
OPPE] and OGC knew even less. In the absence of an explicit problem definition and
an associated strategy, there was only a mass of intricate detail, a series of esoteric
choices whose significance and consequences remained obscure. I I
Largely for historical reasons having to do with the requirements of a
consent decree, 1 12 the Office of Water Regulations and Standards has at times
followed a hierarchical pattern in promulgating effluent limitations and
guidelines for new and existing sources of water pollution. A working group
composed of an engineer, an economist, a statistician, an environmental
specialist from the Office of Water Regulations and Standards, an attorney
from OGC, and a regulatory analyst from OPPE typically prepares the
rulemaking documents and the regulatory analysis documents. As a practical
matter, however, the attorneys and the regulatory analysts rarely participate
until the proposed rule is nearly finished. The working group then presents
options and a recommendation to the director of the Office of Water
Regulations and Standards in a single meeting. Afterwards, the same group
meets with the assistant administrator for water, the assistant administrator
for policy, planning and evaluation, and the general counsel to work out any
remaining disagreements. This procedure follows an attenuated version of
the team model at lower levels but abandons it at higher levels, thereby
avoiding Steering Committee review. However, this procedure can allow
high-level input at relatively early stages in the development of rules.
The greatest advantage of the hierarchical model is that it conserves
agency resources and avoids delays. A single office (and in some cases a
single agency employee) produces the proposed and final regulations and all
of the important documentation in accordance with its own time schedule.
Like its military analog, the hierarchical model provides clear and direct lines
of authority and accountability. If deadlines slip, upper-level decisionmakers
know whom to blame.
The hierarchical model also lodges policymaking in the entities that are
the most knowledgeable about the complex issues that arise on a day-to-day
basis-the program offices. Staff employees in the program offices develop
expertise in the narrow areas encompassed by the rules they draft, and they
tend to derive satisfaction from both this expertise and the de facto
11. Landy, Roberts & Thomas, Asking the It'rong Questions at 125 (cited in note 1).
112. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v EPA, 8 ERC 2120 (D DC 1976). See Kris Hall, The Control of
Toxic Pollutants under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 Iowa L Rev 609
(1978).
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policymaking power they possess, albeit at a micro-policy level. The model is
especially useful for programs involving highly technical issues that lack
significant policy components and for which discretion is sufficiently limited
that exploring a wide range of options would not be especially useful. The
hierarchical model is most appropriate when the agency's statute articulates
clear policy goals and provides the agency with very little discretion. In short,
the hierarchical model makes sense where either the relevant science or the
agency's statutory directives are so clear that agency officials can exercise little
policy discretion.
Perhaps the most obvious drawback of the hierarchical model is its
extremely limited capacity to bring multiple perspectives to bear on complex
regulatory problems. Other disciplines can be heard, but only after the
program office has explored all of the options that it cares to and has arrived
at a preferred alternative. A single person is not likely to have sufficient
expertise to address the bulk of the relevant issues in all but the most
simplistic of EPA's regulatory programs. Likewise, a single program office is
usually incapable of formulating a competent multimedia approach to
regulating pollutants. In the area of environmental regulation, where an
interdisciplinary perspective is essential, the quality of the final rulemaking
product may suffer under the hierarchical model. The end result may be a
lower rate of success on judicial review.
Because it does not allow for input from various perspectives, the
hierarchical model may also be less adept at inducing agency staff to identify
innovative options for solving regulatory problems. For example, the
program office is not likely to have much expertise in identifying market-
oriented approaches to environmental problems, such as the bubble policy,
pollution taxes, and marketable permits.
In addition, animosities can arise when one group of agency professionals
believes that its advice is not being heeded, and, as a result, morale in other
offices may suffer. Since the hierarchical model does not assign to any office
the function of taking a critical look at the program office's work product, bad
ideas may go out over the administrator's signature, and the agency may
experience a humiliating comeuppance when outside commentators or
reviewing courts point out obvious flaws in the agency's proposal during the
notice-and-comment stage.
Finally, the hierarchical model may not work well in programs that must
deal with large data gaps and highly uncertain predictive models. In such
wide-open regulatory contexts, where costs and benefits are not easily
reduced to a common coin, the decisionmaking process can usually profit
from a healthy intra-agency debate before the regulation hits the streets and
becomes the subject of external public criticism.
C. The Outside Advisor Model
The outside advisor model makes better use of agency experts outside the
program office without thoroughly incorporating them into the
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decisionmaking process. Under this model, the program office retains
primary responsibility for drafting the proposed and final rules and the
attendant supporting documentation. However, the program office is free to
call upon other offices in the agency for advice as needed, and they are
obliged to provide input when requested. The outside advisor model differs
from the team model in that the other offices are not officially part of the
decisionmaking process. They speak when spoken to, do not regularly
participate in important decisionmaking meetings, and do not have formal
sign-off authority.
The outside advisor model is in use in many federal agencies. When the
assistant secretary for OSHA abandoned the team model to avoid renegade
teams, the agency substituted the outside advisor model. That model also
accurately describes the relationship between the program office engineers
and the agency regulatory analysts in the Federal Aviation Administration., '3
Most regulations in that agency are drafted by a team of program office
staffers, consisting mostly of engineers, with minimal day-to-day participation
by the agency's attorneys. When the engineers in the program office need
additional expertise, they ask the agency's economists to participate in team
meetings and to draft necessary economic documents." 14 However, the final
say, even over the content of the economic documents, belongs to the
engineers.
The great advantage of the outside advisor model is that it allows the
agency to bring multiple perspectives to bear on regulatory problems while
maintaining clear lines of authority and responsibility for the total rulemaking
effort. Like the hierarchical model, the outside advisor model can conserve
resources and avoid delays, because the decisionmaking process need not get
bogged down in lengthy debates in which other offices demand more data and
analysis. The model conserves valuable professional resources for those
important junctures in the rulemaking process where they are really needed.
For example, officials from the enforcement office can be brought into the
decisionmaking process for the limited purpose of addressing the
enforceability of particular regulatory options without subjecting the
decisionmakers to their opinions on other issues, such as the legitimacy of the
economic cost projections. In addition, the professionals in the program
office usually prefer the outside advisory model because it maintains their
decisionmaking prerogatives. Staffers from outside the program office are not
allowed to dominate the rulemaking process through the force of their
personalities or through extortionate threats to delay. Project leaders in the
program office can call upon agency expertise whenever they need it, without
113. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 204-07 (cited in note 6).
114. There is some evidence that EPA program offices with their own regulatory analysts use
those analysts in the manner suggested by the outside advisor model. See id at 253-54. But the
regulatory analysts in OPPE are definitely equal participants in the workgroup meetings in which
important decisions are made.
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necessarily accepting the attitudes and biases that come with the outside
professional perspectives.
The outside advisor model also has its disadvantages. To the extent that
the outside professionals are not true participants, there is a risk that their
input will be misinterpreted by program office staffers or that the program
office will hear only that which it wants to hear, without listening to important
qualifiers. At the extreme, the outside advisor model may allow the program
office to attach an interdisciplinary patina to decisions actually dominated by a
single perspective. The outside professionals may complain, with some
justification, that their perspectives are solicited not to reach better decisions,
but solely to justify decisions reached on other grounds. As with the
hierarchical model, the outside advisor model does not allow the outside
offices to play a role in identifying options. Similarly, the absence of an
institutional skeptic outside the program office may result in poorly reasoned
approaches finding their way into the Federal Register. Finally, the outside
advisor model is no more likely to achieve an integrated cross-media approach
to regulation than the hierarchical model.
D. The Adversarial Model
The adversarial model forces staffers with different perspectives to
confront one another in an adversarial setting. Each office is responsible for
assembling its own information and analyses and for critiquing the
information and analyses of the other offices. Disagreements over facts,
assumptions, inferences, or policies are aired in an adversarial fashion, either
in memoranda or in oral presentations, before the ultimate agency
decisionmaker. Although it is conceivable that the adversarial model could
incorporate three or more offices within a single agency, it is typically limited
to two offices with widely differing perspectives, usually the program office
and the policy office.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") has
employed the adversarial model for a number of years in writing automobile
safety standards." 5 NHTSA leadership has made a conscious effort to play
the program office and the policy office against each other until fairly late
stages of the internal decisionmaking process. After the program office
obtains upper-level approval to undertake a rulemaking initiative, it begins to
assemble data and analyses on the effectiveness and costs of several
alternative approaches. At roughly the same time, the policy office begins to
prepare a regulatory analysis document and conduct an independent
examination of the relevant data on the costs and effectiveness of different
alternatives. There is relatively little contact between the two offices until
each has completed its initial work, at which point each office examines and
critiques the work of the other. Since the program office approaches the
effort from a strong engineering perspective and the policy office approaches
115. See id at 229-34.
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it from an equally strong economics perspective, it is not surprising that the
two offices usually disagree on the appropriate approach to take and upon
other significant aspects of the rulemaking. After the two offices attempt to
reconcile their differences, any remaining disputes are resolved by the
administrator after each side has a full opportunity to present its position,
either orally or in writing. The program office's product has often changed
dramatically as a result of the internal dialectic with the policy office, and
there can be little doubt that the model has had a profound effect on the
substantive outcome of NHTSA rules.
Although EPA's administrator has no doubt witnessed debates that are
very similar to the adversarial meetings before NHTSA's administrator,
internal conflicts are not consciously structured into EPA's decisionmaking
process. EPA's policy office constantly reviews and critiques the work of the
program offices, and great clashes of perspectives often result. But in EPA
there are strong pressures to avoid such clashes and instead achieve
consensus. Upper-level decisionmakers make no effort to harness the natural
adversarial tensions and direct them toward creative ends.
The great advantage of the adversarial model is its ability to maximize the
decisionmaker's discretion by making him or her aware in stark (sometimes
overstated) terms of the pros and cons of several important options. Unlike
the team model, in which a great deal of decisionmaking discretion is
exercised at fairly low levels, the adversarial model discourages low-level
compromises on important regulatory issues without upper-level input. It is
highly unlikely that the professionals in one office will be co-opted by another
office under the adversarial model, and innovative options will probably not
be rejected out of any perceived need to reach an overall staff consensus.
Upper-level decisionmakers in NHTSA believe that the "creative tension"
spawned by the adversarial approach is the best way to ensure that the staff-
prepared decision memoranda are not loaded in favor of a particular option.
They believe that the adversarial process "not only produces the best possible
data and analysis, but also provides the Administrator with the most
independent and objective advice for arriving at the best possible rulemaking
decisions."' 16
The adversarial model also reduces the incidence of purely technical
errors, because virtually every prediction and calculation receives the intense
scrutiny of a skeptical adversary within the agency. Moreover, the adversarial
model inhibits the natural tendency of bureaucrats to ignore or belittle
information that undercuts their position. Each office can be confident that
any failure to portray data accurately or to avoid the negative implications of
existing studies will come to the decisionmaker's attention before the rule
leaves the agency. By fostering the broadest possible exchange of
information and analysis, the adversarial approach can go a long way toward
116. Regulatory Reform Act 248, Hearings on HR 2327 before the Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong, Ist Sess (1983) (testimony of Mr. Frank Berndt, chief counsel, NHTSA).
[Vol. 54: No. 4
Page 57: Autumn 1991] EPA RULEMAKING
exposing hidden agendas in both offices. In the long run this is a virtue,
because it helps the agency avoid embarrassment later in the rulemaking
process. 1 17
If the regulatory analysis office becomes a major player under the
adversarial model, agency decisions will reflect to a greater degree than under
other models the economic perspective that characterizes that office. The
regulatory analyst's market-oriented policy preferences will receive a full
airing in the agency's internal debates. If the agency's regulatory analysts are
effective advocates, they may become influential determiners of agency policy.
The primary disadvantage of the adversarial model is that it requires
duplication of agency effort that is extremely resource intensive. Each of the
two or more offices that participate in the process performs many of the same
data gathering, analysis, and review functions. In addition, the tendency of
the adversarial model to discourage the early sharing of information can
result in unnecessary waste of precious analytical and technical resources later
in the process. For example, if the policy analysis office identifies a number of
options that the program office has failed to study, there is a real possibility
that the program office may have to redraft its documents and perhaps even
undertake further research, thus delaying the rulemaking efforts. The
program office also may have to scramble to find or produce data on a fresh
option, or it may simply attempt to amend existing documents to include the
new option, thereby increasing the likelihood of technical mistakes.
While one of the adversarial model's great advantages is its capacity to
expand the choices available to upper-level decisionmakers, it likewise
117. Some commentators have suggested that an adversarial proceeding before an expert
"science court" may be the best vehicle for resolving intricate science/policy disputes about which
the relevant experts disagree. The adversarial model could in a similar fashion be adapted to the
Science Advisory Apparatus by encouraging sharp debate between competing offices or suboffices
before the appropriate science advisory committee. EPA Science Advisory Board meetings tend to
be exceedingly civilized affairs with little internal dissention among the agency staff. The adversarial
qualities the process currently possesses stem from the participation of outsiders from industry and
environmental groups. Allowing EPA's internal advocates to debate technical points before a group
of experts could broaden the range of information and analysis available to the scientists in the
scientific advisory apparatus.
The most serious impediment to adapting the adversarial model to intra-agency disputes before
science advisory committees stems from the fact that under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5
USC App §§ 1 et seq (1985), Pub L No 92-463, 86 Stat 770 (Oct 6, 1972), advisory committee
meetings must be open to the public. The agency may not always be willing to air internal disputes
in a public forum.
Perhaps a greater disadvantage of the "internal science court" idea stems from the fact that the
issues about which adversarial disputes are likely to erupt are not questions of pure science, but must
be decided by reference to appropriate regulatory policies. See McGarity, 67 Georgetown LJ 729,
731-49 (cited in note 104). Yet these are precisely the kinds of issues that should not be resolved by
unaccountable advisory committees, because they are no more expert in choosing the appropriate
regulatory policy for resolving science/policy disputes than the agency decisionmakers. Indeed,
upper-level decisionmakers who routinely defer to the science advisory apparatus to resolve
science/policy questions are in a very real sense shirking their statutory duty to decide science/policy
questions in accordance with statutory policies. Adapting the adversarial model to agency
presentations to science advisory committees may help sharpen the agency's understanding of
critical scientific questions, but it should be attempted only for relatively "pure" questions of science
and not questions with large policy components.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
demands more of their time and attention. The model encourages dissent at
low levels and forces upper-level decisionmakers to resolve the disputes.
Because there is no predetermined place in the decisionmaking process for
selecting among regulatory options, disputes requiring upper-level attention
can erupt at almost any time. Upper-level decisionmakers must therefore
maintain a continuing familiarity with the complex issues in the ongoing
internal proceedings.
The tension that the adversarial model generates may not necessarily be
"creative." ' it 8 Organizational subunits in large bureaucracies are already
prone toward pettiness, "turf consciousness," and personality conflicts. The
conscious adoption of an adversarial decisionmaking approach may divert
even more energy into petty bickering, "one-upmanship," and other
unproductive activities. The disputants may begin to lose sight of the
agency's broader goals in their desire to win intra-agency battles and enhance
the institutional status of their offices. At the same time, the adversarial
model risks damage to agency morale if one office loses intra-agency disputes
more frequently than the others.
Substantive decisions under the adversarial model may depend too greatly
upon the advocacy skill of the personnel in the various offices. If one of the
contending offices is blessed with an able advocate for a leader, it may win
more regulatory battles for this reason alone. This is especially true if OGC is
one of the advocates. But'the fact that the lawyer can make a better case for
his or her position than the scientist does not mean that the agency's decisions
will win more support in external forums. On the other hand, upper-level
decisionmakers, like good judges, should acquire over time the ability to
discount this factor sufficiently to reach sound regulatory decisions, even if it
means ruling against the better advocate.
E. The Hybrid Model Formerly Employed at EPA
During the second Ruckelshaus Administration, Deputy Administrator
Alvin Alm implemented an ambitious hybrid decisionmaking model for EPA
rulemaking that incorporated many of the virtues of both the adversarial and
team models, while avoiding some of their pitfalls. Labelled the "options
review process," the model's primary aim was to maximize upper-level input
into lower-level decisionmaking in a systematic fashion.' 19
All major and significant rules were required to go through this options
review process. 120 Early in the development of a major or significant
regulation, the deputy administrator designated it for either Level I or Level
II options review.' 2 ' The Level I determination indicated that a rule would
receive more intense upper-level scrutiny. The assistant administrators for
118. See Marcus, Promise and Performance at 106 (cited in note 1).
119. See McGarity, Reinventing Rationality at 243-51 (cited in note 6).
120. Procedures Memo at 2 (cited in note 41).
121. Memorandum on Options Selection/Rejection Process from Alvin L. Aim, EPA Deputy
Administrator to EPA Assistant Administrators and General Counsel, Nov 4, 1983.
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the regulatory programs nominated candidates for Level I options review.
Although the assistant administrators and their immediate staffs drew upon
lower-level staff for suggestions and information, the decision whether to
nominate a rule for Level I options review was made at a very high level within
the program office. In nominating regulations for the options review process,
the assistant administrators took into account the cost of the rule, the
likelihood that it would generate public controversy, and the importance of
the rule to the regulatory program. They also looked to the precedential
value of the rule for future agency rulemakings and to the probability that the
rule would require the agency to resolve major cross-program policy issues.
The importance of the options review process was underscored by the fact
that only about twenty to thirty rules per year could be designated for Level I
review.
The options review process for Level I rules was implemented through
quarterly planning meetings and more frequent options selection/rejection
meetings chaired by the deputy administrator. The quarterly planning
meetings were intended to (1) provide a status overview of all Level I rules;
(2) provide advance notice of rules that would be ripe for an options
selection/rejection review during the quarter; and (3) decide which assistant
administrators and regional administrators should participate in particular
options selection/rejection meetings.1 22  Options selection/rejection
meetings were held for individual regulations at crucial decision points in the
rulemaking process. Since Deputy Administrator Alm had a strong
preference for resolving potential intra-agency disputes at a very early stage,
these meetings were usually scheduled at early points in a workgroup's
decisionmaking. The precise timing of the first meeting was somewhat
flexible. It was supposed to occur early enough in the rulemaking process
that options were realistically available, but late enough to provide the
workgroup an opportunity to analyze the problem and the existing data
sufficiently to crystallize the thinking of its members. More than one meeting
could be scheduled prior to the promulgation of the proposed rule if other
issues needing high-level input arose during the workgroup's deliberations.
For all Level I rules, the lead office prepared an options memorandum for
the review meeting and circulated it to the members of the committee. 123 The
memorandum was supposed to identify several options (perhaps six or seven)
that the upper-level policymakers could narrow to a smaller range of options
(perhaps three or four) for consideration in detail prior to the publication of
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The program office staff attempted to
identify and explain a broad range of options without going into such an
extensive explanation of any particular option that the upper-level
decisionmakers would get bogged down in the details. On the infrequent
occasions in which the available range of options was quite limited, the
122. Id.
123. Criteria and Guidelines Memo at 5-6 (cited in note 41).
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options review meeting was essentially limited to choosing between the
options of going forward with the proposed rule or doing nothing.
At the options selection/rejection meeting, the high level participants
attempted "to agree on which options to retain for further development and
which to reject."1 24 The meeting was also an appropriate place for an office
to suggest an option that the program office rejected or otherwise failed to
include in the options memorandum. The participants at the meeting, who
included the relevant assistant administrators and the deputy administrator,
would then decide whether the lead office should analyze and consider the
neglected option.' 25 The more serious discussion at the first meeting
concerned the selection of three or four preferred options from among the
options listed in the options memorandum. This meeting was thus an early
forum in which any office could candidly raise questions about the substantive
advantages and disadvantages of the regulatory options that the program
office selected. Since one of the options was nearly always to do nothing, this
meeting also presented an opportunity for institutional skeptics (usually in the
Office of Policy Analysis) to question the need for any regulation at all.
In approximately 50 percent of the meetings, the Office of Policy Analysis
took a position that varied significantly from that of the program office, and
the staff of the Office of Policy Analysis occasionally drafted a separate
memorandum setting out the nature of the disagreement and the arguments
favoring its resolution of those issues. Debates about whether to pursue an
option further were most likely to arise when the program office took the
position that it lacked the authority to choose that option. In such cases the
program office was reluctant to expend analytical resources to study an
impossible option, and OGC often weighed in on the program office's side of
the dispute.126 If the options review committee could not reach consensus,
the dissenters could have their recommendations included in the closure
memorandum, which served as a vehicle for documenting the meeting's
results and for explaining remaining disagreements to the deputy
administrator and ultimately the administrator. 27
Although the options selection/rejection meeting was very effective in
selecting a few options from among the options suggested by the workgroup
for more intense analysis, the participants at those meetings rarely identified
124. Procedures Memo at 7 (cited in note 41).
125. Before the assistant administrators committed themselves to engage in a debate before the
deputy administrator over the failure of the lead office to include an option in the Options
Memorandum, they would usually instruct their staffs to attempt to work out their differences, and
the assistant administrators themselves may have met with each other to arrive at a solution. At this
stage of the process, compromise was not normally difficult, because a decision to include an option
in the Options Memorandum merely allows the deputy administrator to consider the option; the lead
office may still argue that the option should be rejected.
126. See, for example, Alm to Decide Risk Assessment Funding Squabble on Waste Tank Regs, 5 Inside
EPA 3 (June 29, 1984) (debate between Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response and OPPE
over whether a risk assessment for technology-based regulations should be prepared and, if so, who
should pay for it).
127. Procedures Memo at 7 (cited in note 41).
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new options that the workgroup participants had failed to spot. The options
selection/rejection meetings could also reveal gaps in the available
information that were so substantial that the deputy administrator remanded
the project for further data gathering and analysis.' 28
After the workgroup finished its deliberation for Level I rules, it could
prepare another options memorandum listing the advantages and
disadvantages of the options that it studied following the first Level I meeting.
If the deputy administrator decided that the issues were sufficiently important,
he could schedule a second options selection/rejection meeting prior to
sending the package to the administrator. Later, after the workgroup had
finished digesting the public comments on the proposed rule, still another
options selection/rejection meeting could be scheduled to allow the deputy
administrator to narrow the options still available to the workgroup for the
final rule.
The options review process had five goals. First, upper-level
decisionmakers viewed the Level I options selection/rejection meeting as "an
institutional mechanism for forcing consideration of a much broader
spectrum of approaches to the regulatory problem."1 29 Having forced lower-
level staff to identify a broad range of options, a second purpose of the
process was to allow high-level policymakers to narrow the range of options
that the workgroup considered and, as the rulemaking process progressed
toward completion, to select the option that would go forward to the
administrator and OMB as the agency's preferred option.' 30 Third, by
forcing mid-level management to consider the implications of many options
for all institutionally important decisions, the process was intended to make
mid-level (career) management more accountable to high-level (politically
appointed) management.' 3' Fourth, by assigning a prominent role to the
agency's regulatory analysts, the process was intended to eliminate the
perception on the part of the technical staff in the program offices that the
regulatory analysts were officious intermeddlers in the decisionmaking
process. 13 2
Finally, the options review process was intended to give upper-level
management a greater role in the subtle policymaking that inevitably takes
place at low levels in the bureaucracy when options are examined and rejected
as the workgroup members attempt to reach consensus. The new
management team that came to the agency with Administrator Ruckelshaus
128. The workgroup itself served as the Options Review Committee for Level II rules. When it
submitted its final decision package for Steering Committee and Red Border Review, the lead office
included a summary of the options that the workgroup considered and rejected, stating when and
why each was rejected. Procedures Memo at 7 (cited in note 4 1). The Steering Committee meeting
then performed much the same function for Level II and other rules that the Options Review
meeting performs for Level I rules.
129. Personal interview with Mr. Rob Wolcott, Special Assistant to the Deputy Administrator,
EPA, June 27, 1984 ("Wolcott Interview").
130. Criteria and Guidelines Memo at 5 (cited in note 41).
131. Wolcott Interview (cited in note 129).
132. Id.
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believed that high-level policymakers were able to play only a small role in the
decisionmaking process under the team model because the consensus-
building process in the workgroups eliminated most viable options before
rules went forward for upper-level review. In most cases, as noted above, the
workgroup process effectively lined up all of the relevant institutional entities
behind a single recommendation to the administrator. The administrator in
reality had only two options: he could accept the recommendation, or he
could send everyone back to square one. The practical effect of this situation
was that much agency policy was made at the level of the branch chiefs. The
new administration created the options review process as a vehicle for
retaining the benefits of the team approach (such as information sharing and a
multidisciplinary perspective) while enhancing the role of the politically
appointed upper-level management in the decisionmaking process.
Although there is no evidence that the agency failed to meet these goals in
any significant way, the options review process was abandoned not long after
Administrator Thomas succeeded Administrator Ruckelshaus. One reason
for the tacit decision to abandon the process was the fact that Deputy
Administrator Alm, who had a great personal stake in the success of the
process that he designed, left the agency with Ruckelshaus. His successor was
not a take-charge decisionmaker, and (according to some agency officials) he
was apparently uncomfortable with the pressure that the process placed on
him to make on-the-spot decisions. In any event, it appears that
Administrator Thomas was not willing to cede much decisionmaking power to
his deputy. After a short time during which Thomas himself chaired the
options selection/rejection meetings, the options review process was quietly
abandoned.
Although the hybrid options review model has been abandoned, it still has
much to commend it. First, it shares the team model's ability to bring
different perspectives to bear upon information gathering and data
evaluation. That aspect of the rulemaking process is still very much in the
bailiwick of the workgroup under the hybrid model. Second, by forcing lower
level staff to analyze a broad range of realistic options prior to the options
selection/rejection meetings, it reduces the workgroup's tendency to exclude
options that might be controversial and therefore fracture the group's
consensus. Third, by giving all of the designated participants a "day in court"
before one of the highest level agency decisionmakers early in the process,
while many options are still alive, it interjects a creative adversarial note into
the agency deliberations thereby reducing the potential for groupthink.
Fourth, the process reduces the risk of alienating the office on the losing side
of important policy debates, because the deputy administrator hears both
sides of all arguments and often decides issues in the presence of the staff,
and not later after an opportunity for insider lobbying. Fifth, by forcing all
branches of the agency to identify options early in the process, it helps ensure
against the "late hit phenomenon," where one office brings up an option very
late in the process and urges the program office to slow the process while that
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option is being considered. Finally, the model retains the adversarial model's
capacity to maximize the decisionmaking discretion of upper-level
decisionmakers and thereby reduces the likelihood of "staff capture."' 33
The hybrid model, however, has many of the disadvantages of the team
and adversarial models, although in somewhat moderated forms. First, the
model is very resource intensive, especially at upper-levels. The process
demands a great deal of the attention of very high-level decisionmakers. Yet
the key to its success is their willingness (and ability) to devote the time and
intellectual effort necessary to prepare for the sometimes grueling review
meetings. Although Administrator Ruckelshaus, who inaugurated the
process, devoted very little attention to it, his deputy administrator was
committed to the process and devoted a great deal of energy to the process.
In the hands of less dedicated upper-level decisionmakers, the process rapidly
reverted to the team model.
A second disadvantage is that the options review process may force closure
too rapidly on very important issues without the reflection necessary for
informed decisionmaking. A single three-hour meeting with the key staff and
the administrator or deputy administrator may not be sufficient to air all of the
important issues. Critical options may be eliminated because the proponents
of one side of the debate are better advocates, rather than because their
position is best for the agency. The administrator may need time to mull over
the arguments pro and con in private or with a few trusted advisers, rather
than decide issues with enormous consequences on-the-spot.
Despite the problems, the hybrid model appears to be an extremely
effective vehicle for communicating policy. The essence of the model is that it
gives upper-level decisionmakers greater input into the decisionmaking
process at an early stage. The content of that input, which can obviously be
very influential in the workgroup meetings that follow, depends upon the
policy preferences and thoughts of the deputy administrator or the
administrator. In a democracy, in which the bureaucracy must ultimately be
held accountable to the public, this is as it should be.
VI
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR EPA
This article has examined how structured approaches to integrating
various professional perspectives into EPA's decisionmaking process can both
facilitate the promulgation and change the substantive content of EPA rules.
Obviously, structure is not the only determinant of EPA decisionmaking.
Institutions external to EPA, such as congressional committees, OMB, and the
reviewing courts, all exert exceedingly powerful pressure on the agency and
133. Staff capture, a malady much feared by OMB officials, occurs when a politically appointed
official becomes so immersed in day-to-day briefings by the agency's professional staff that he or she
loses his or her objectivity (or perhaps ideology) and begins to view the world from the staff's
perspective.
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are quite capable of bogging down the rulemaking process in interminable
delays and of steering the agency in particular directions.
Agency structure may not even be the most important internal
determinant of EPA rulemaking. The unique administrative talents,
leadership abilities, and foibles of the administrator and the perception of the
administrator's personal strengths and weaknesses no doubt have a profound
impact during his or her (usually brief) tenure.
Likewise, the personalities of the public servants who occupy leadership
positions in the agency undeniably play a role in the allocation of power
within the agency. And the allocation of institutional power is in turn
reflected in the agency's substantive output. For example, during the second
Ruckelshaus Administration, the powerful deputy administrator's strong
analytical bent ensured that EPA regulatory analysts were "top dogs" in
internal agency debates, and the agency's substantive output was often more
sensitive to cost considerations.
Yet the importance of personalities should not be overemphasized.
People come and go. When Deputy Administrator Alm was succeeded by the
former general counsel, the agency's analysts were no longer invited to
private t~te-a-t~te with the deputy administrator, and their office was reduced
to the status of equal among equals. Not surprisingly, agency decisions,
particularly in the area of hazardous wastes, became somewhat less cost
sensitive.
EPA engaged in an unorthodox experiment in modifying the role of
individual players in 1985 when the administrator reassigned office directors
to different offices. 134 In addition to injecting new blood into some anemic
programs, this shift tended to reduce the effect of personality on the
substance of agency rules. The NHTSA undertook a similar experiment in
1985 when it allowed the head of the regulatory analysis office to become the
head of the program office. EPA should continue to experiment with such
personnel trades to allow the professional perspectives upon which the
agency's expertise is built to interact freely, without being constrained by
powerful personalities.
Although agency structure may not be everything, it counts for something,
and usually it counts for a lot. Strong personalities of mid-level bureaucrats,
fitm bonds of trust between upper-level decisionmakers, and the particular
predilection of the administrator and deputy administrator all can decisively
determine the priority status and substantive outcome of a few particularly
important rules. But over the course of day-to-day decisionmaking, the
structure of the decisionmaking process may be the most important
determinant. In any event, even when an administrator or deputy
administrator has a strong desire to drive the substantive output of agency
rules in a particular direction or when a strong mid-level official becomes a
134. Seven Senior EPA Officials Reassigned by Thomas in Ongoing lanagement Changes. 16 Envir Rep 542
(August 2, 1985).
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powerful bureaucratic actor, the vehicle for implementing substantive change
is structural. For example, the clearest measure of the decline of the status of
EPA's regulatory analysts after Deputy Administrator Aim left the agency was
the structural fact that OPPE no longer had a de facto veto power over
important agency rules. The agency's formal decisionmaking documents may
not have announced this power shift, but it was no doubt reflected in the
substance of the rules.
EPA has in the past relied heavily upon the team model. Undoubtedly,
this has contributed substantially to the coherence and consistency EPA
decisionmaking has exhibited over time. The team model has enabled EPA
decisions to reflect multiple perspectives, but it has also ensured that few truly
innovative regulatory approaches have survived the consensus building
process that characterizes the model. The bubble policy, which emerged from
the agency after years of internal debates, was an innovative regulatory tool,
but it is the notable exception that proves the general rule that the agency
adopts a cautious approach that minimizes internal conflict and maximizes the
probability of successful judicial and political review. In short, EPA
decisionmaking under the team model is competent, but boring. This may be
altogether appropriate; bureaucracies are not usually exciting places, nor are
they meant to be. Yet even a bureaucracy must maintain some vitality if it is to
attract and keep intelligent young staffers. Consensus-building helps
maintain stability, but dissent inspires creativity and enhances the ability of
upper-level political appointees to lead.
EPA decisionmaking under the team model is also very slow. Although
much of the time consumed while a rulemaking initiative is pending in the
agency is attributable to the complexity of the issues and the consequent
demand for data and analysis, the team model, with its lack of clear lines of
accountability, no doubt exacerbates the problem. A hierarchical approach
(as its military analog suggests) can get the job done in a hurry, but the
product may be unidimensional. In an agency that constantly addresses
multidimensional issues, such products may not survive judicial and political
review. The adversarial model may lend creativity to the process, but it can be
even more time consuming than the team model.
The agency need not hew to a single model for every decision. The team
model, which is the predominant model for regulatory decisionmaking, is
certainly a good starting point. Rulemaking initiatives presumptively should
be governed by that model, but upper-level decisionmakers should consider
supplementing or replacing it when it appears to be failing. The hybrid
options review process, for example, is a superb compromise between the
team and adversarial model, and it demands a high level of upper-level
attention. For important rulemaking initiatives, upper-level decisionmakers
should be out in front making important decisions, and the options review
model helps ensure that critical decisions are made by the people who are
paid to make them. But this hybrid model is much too demanding of upper-
level attention to routine rules. The agency should consider re-implementing
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the options review model for the most important ten to twenty rules it
promulgates each year.
For other, more routine rules, the agency should consider greater use of
the outside advisor model. In practice, the team model conforms to the
outside advisor model for uninteresting rules, because workgroup meetings
are attended by only the very few invitees with something to contribute. The
problem with this de facto use of the outside advisor model is that it still
leaves all members of the team with sign-off power. In addition to slowing the
process, this fact also probably gives too much power to the absent regulatory
analysts and OGC who can use the threat of delay to extract substantive
concessions from the program offices. Although OPPE no longer displays the
overt bias against regulation it once did, and although EPA decisions should
reflect the analytical perspective of that office, it is not clear that OPPE must
be an equal participant in regulatory decisionmaking for less important rules.
Its input should be solicited, and on occasion demanded,1 5 but its approval
should not be required.
The same may be true for the input of OGC. While its advice on matters
of statutory interpretation is critical and cannot be ignored, its opinions on
the substantive merits of regulatory decisions that come by way of its role as
predictor of judicial reaction is essentially outside advice that the program
office should be free to take or ignore. Both OPPE and OGC should be able
to raise objections of any kind at the Steering Committee level to the extent
that they have raised the objections to the program office during the rule's
generation, but for most of the agency's unimportant rules, it is not apparent
why either office should have a veto power on issues not involving statutory
interpretation. Even if the agency elects not to return to the hybrid options
review model, the distinction between Level I rules and Level II rules may be
useful for targeting rules for full-fledged workgroups and rules for which a
hierarchical or outside advisor approach will be adopted.
The Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, on the other
hand, is rarely available even as an outside advisor to agency workgroups.
Because the enforcement perspective is critical for rules that must be
implemented in the field, the agency's enforcers should be encouraged to play
a more prominent role in the rulemaking process for important rules. 136 The
agency's management should consider vehicles for inviting or demanding the
participation of representatives from this office on workgroups or for
requiring systematic responses to early drafts of proposed rules.
135. Many programs have internal regulatory analysts, some of which perform in an outside
advisor capacity. For these offices, it may not be necessary to insist that OPPE play an additional
outside advisor role.
136. A working group for EPA's Enforcement in the 1990s project recently recommended that
the enforcement office play a greater role in the rulemaking process "to enhance the link between
implementation and enforcement of a rule." Enforcement 1990s Group Recommends Changes for
Management of EPA Activities in Next Decade, 21 Envir Rep 161 (May 11, 1990).
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VII
CONCLUSION
With the very notable exception of the turbulent early 1980s, EPA has
acquired a well-deserved reputation as one of the most intelligently run
agencies in the federal government. While its output has never been high, it
has (with the above noted exception) been of increasingly high quality. In
short, EPA has adapted well to the modern reality of complex scientific and
technical rulemaking. In many areas, such as its innovative action tracking
system, it has served as a model for other agencies. Yet there is always room
for improvement. Perhaps more accurately, there is always room for
adaptability as conditions change and as upper-level appointees come and
leave. As it enters its third decade, EPA has come a long way, but it still has a
long way to go.
Some observers have suggested that agencies undergo an evolution from
vigorous youth to stable old age,' 3 7 and in the process the original goals
become less important than the survival of the institution. The extraordinary
transformation of EPA at the end of the Gorsuch fiasco and its recent
reinvigoration under an administrator and president who at least talk like the
environment matters suggest that this theory may be inaccurate. The
environment is a better place than it was twenty years ago. If EPA can
continue to evolve and to reaffirm its goals, it may be able to delay old age
indefinitely. To a substantial degree this will depend upon the agency's ability
to adapt its internal decisionmaking structures to changing internal and
external realities. If EPA can successfully postpone old age, the environment
will be a much better place twenty years from now than it is today.
137. See E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, IJ L Econ & Org 313 (1985); E. Donald Elliott, The
Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum L Rev 38 (1985); William Rodgers, Jr., The Natural Law
of Administrative Law, 48 Mo L Rev 101 (1983).
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